re: Official US/Israel vs Iran war thread

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16 Iranian military transport aircraft destroyed on the runway at Mehrabad.

These weren't fighter jets. They were the trucks of Iran's war machine, the planes that flew cash to Hezbollah, weapons to the Houthis, equipment to militias across the Middle East for decades.

No transport aircraft means no rapid troop deployment. No moving missile components between facilities. No resupplying proxies from Baghdad to Beirut.

The IRGC's entire regional logistics network ran through Mehrabad. One strike grounded it permanently.

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BREAKING: This footage was recorded by someone driving near Fat'h helicopter base of the IRGC Ground Force Aviation branch near Karaj, on the third day of the war. You can see that the Israeli airstrikes shattered the windshields of the car.

All helicopters inside that base, including some or possibly all of the newly delivered Mi-28NE attack helicopters of the IRGC, were destroyed.

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U.S. officials are reportedly discussing seizing Kharg Island, the offshore terminal responsible for 90% of Iran's oil exports.

We're talking direct American military control of Iran's economic lifeline.

That's just the opening move. The plan then shifts to securing Iran's nuclear facilities and locking down the Strait of Hormuz itself.

America wouldn't just be bombing Iran anymore. It would be occupying its most strategic assets.

Kharg Island. Nuclear sites. Hormuz.

That's literally the takeover of the Persian Gulf.

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“War is the continuation of politics by other means.” – Carl von Clausewitz
Seven days into the U.S.–Israel war with Iran, the central question is not simply what has happened on the battlefield, but whether the strategy behind the war is working.
In classical strategic terms, war must always be evaluated through the relationship between political objectives and military action. The Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz argued that the political objective determines the military means used to achieve it. The success of a war cannot be measured simply by explosions, missile launches, or headlines. It must be measured by whether the use of force achieves the political objectives of the war, whether through territorial control, destruction of military capability, or compelling the enemy to change its behavior in accordance with those objectives.
The first task, therefore, is to identify what those objectives actually are.
Thus far, the United States has been consistent in publicly stating its goals. President Donald Trump’s March 1 statement announcing the start of operations made clear that the war is aimed at ending the Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons pursuit, destroying the missile capabilities that Tehran has long used as a shield for that nuclear ambition, and eliminating Iran’s ability to threaten global commerce through the Strait of Hormuz.
Senior officials have repeated this framework in multiple public briefings, including remarks by President Trump on March 1, Secretary of State Marco Rubio on March 2, and joint press conferences by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine on March 2 and March 4.
Across these statements, the political objective has remained consistent.
This is not a declared regime change war.
That distinction matters. Strategic objectives must be judged based on what political leaders state as their aims, not what critics speculate those aims might secretly become. The stated goal of this war is not to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran. The stated goal is to compel the regime to fundamentally change its behavior: abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions, degrade its ballistic missile capabilities, stop threatening the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and cease its decades-long use of proxy terrorism across the Middle East.
If the regime ultimately collapses under the pressure of military defeat or internal revolt, that would certainly be a positive outcome of the war. But it has not, at least publicly, been declared as its strategic objective.
This distinction is not academic.
I understand the skepticism surrounding wars in the Middle East. I participated in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was explicitly framed as a regime change war. The stated objective was the removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party from power, along with the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs.
Like many soldiers preparing for that operation, my unit was told by our two-star commander that the campaign would likely be a sixty-day operation.
But to be very clear and frank: Iran is not Iraq.
The Saddam regime was removed from power quickly, but the United States then disbanded the Iraqi army and large parts of the Ba’ath government structure. What followed was a prolonged effort to impose a new political system and conduct nation-building while fighting a growing insurgency. Nation-building and counterinsurgency became the dominant mission, far beyond the initial objectives of the invasion.
History unfolded very differently than originally planned.
But strategic analysis must evaluate the war that exists, not the war people fear might emerge. Until the United States alters its stated political objectives, the strategy must be measured against the goals that have actually been articulated.
In Clausewitzian terms, the question becomes simple: Is force being used effectively to compel Iran to do our will?
Seven days into the war, the evidence increasingly suggests that it is.
The United States and Israel are imposing their will on the Islamic regime in Iran.
To understand why this matters, we must also understand Iran’s strategy.
Clausewitz described war as “nothing but a duel on a larger scale.” He wrote that the struggle resembles two wrestlers locked together, each trying to throw the other to the ground in order to render him incapable of resistance.
For decades, Iran pursued a grand strategy built on terrorism, proxy warfare, and regional chaos. The regime invested billions in militant groups, missile forces, and destabilizing campaigns across the Middle East. From Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Tehran cultivated armed proxies designed to threaten Israel, attack American forces, intimidate neighboring states, and destabilize the region.
Chaos was not a side effect of Iran’s strategy. It was the strategy.
But when this war began on March 1, Iran entered the conflict with a more immediate wartime strategy.
Iran sought to spread enough devastation across the region to fracture the coalition forming against it. Missile and drone attacks were launched not only against Israel but across the broader region in an attempt to threaten multiple states simultaneously and create fear throughout the Middle East.
The goal was to destabilize neighboring countries, intimidate American partners, and disrupt global energy markets by threatening shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and through attacks across the region.
At the same time, Iran hoped to force the United States into a strategic dilemma. If the regime could absorb the initial blows and continue launching attacks across the region, Washington would face two unattractive choices: allow the regime to survive with its nuclear and missile ambitions intact, or launch a large-scale ground invasion of Iran that would likely be costly, prolonged, and politically divisive.
In other words, Iran hoped to widen the war faster than the United States and Israel could control it. So far, that strategy appears to be failing.
This war now presents the possibility of reversing Iran’s regional model.
Instead of a Middle East shaped by terrorism and proxy conflict, the outcome of this war could move the region toward something very different: a Middle East of partnered countries committed to peace, coexistence, security cooperation, and economic prosperity.
But achieving that outcome requires breaking the tools Iran built to sustain its strategy. That process is now underway.

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My entire family lives near the Rey refinery
After the explosion, the ground shook
My darling nephew hasn't stopped crying
My older brother had a panic attack from the blast wave
The neighborhood is filled with black smoke and you can't see across the street
But my whole family is happy and waiting for the next attack !!

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