re: BP Reveals 'Fundamental Mistake' on Oil Well

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I didn't get the feeling that the Shell former CEO was on a high horse at all ...

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Fair enough. I may be taking his response out of context.

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I also got the impression that he was not saying every company should have them on standby ... just NOW doing cleanup.

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Thats the thing, you just pull a supertanker with a topside production package out of your buttocks. What he describes is an FPSO. Even if you simplified the production equipment... The lead time would be far longer than the time to drill a relief well. Not to mention putting a large tanker on charter isn't exactly instantaneous either.

Further, the onsite rig has the capability of separating and storing enough produced fluid to make shuttling with a barge possible. This what they are using for the siphon tube. Don't know the exact numbers on the rigs capacity, but if it's enough to test the well... It should be enough for recovering after a blow out. Or am I missing something?

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FPSO

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they only have 1 in the gulf currently right now, correct?

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In its internal investigation, BP also flags up cement problems, adding that the float collar initially did not operate as intended - it appears it took nine attempts with higher than usual pressures to get the float to bump.

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Seems to this woulda been a big red flag. 9 tries at bumping the plug? They had to be pumping fluid past it, screwing up the slurry. The least of your problems would be a wet shoe.

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FPSO

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they only have 1 in the gulf currently right now, correct?

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Incorrect.

They only have 1 in the US gulf waters. I believe there are 3 of them in Mexican waters.

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8 1/2" x 9 7/8" out of 9 7/8" liner.

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So 51 bbls would have covered around 1,000 feet?

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about that. 3 bbls in the shoe track, and toc in the annulus ~200 beneath the 9 7/8" liner shoe.

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Yep, that matches up with my figures.

i guess it should have. i have to think contamination would have been a problem w/ the small volume slurry / large displacement in an SBM environment though.

Most companies employ some type of safety program like "STOP"(Safety Training Observation Program)...among other safety programs. This is typically implemented throughout the organization, from top to bottom. Part of this training is for employees to understand and accept responsibility to "STOP" any action at anytime that may seem unsafe. Now this doesn't mean to just walk up to the company man and say I am shutting down this rig. No, employees ARE trained to stop an operation and state the reason of concern and produce some discussion on the topic from a safety stand point. Also, employees(specifically managers/supervisors) are trained to accept STOP from subordinates. This isn't about questioning a manager or supervisor's direction or leadership, but PREVENTING accidents and creating a safer workplace.

I am curious if this scenario played out on the Deepwater Horizon.

In addition to all the discussion about who is calling the shots on the DH, the decisions by those in a leadership role on the offshore rig are driven by those in upper management, onshore back in the office. From everything I've read since this incident occurred, the urgency delivered by upper management to offshore personnel to get this rig moved to the next well is the "Fundamental Mistake" that led to this tragedy. This would seem to have influenced the decisions of those in a leadership role on the Deepwater Horizon and led to a bypass of safety protocol.

However, we are just all speculating without knowing all the facts of the incident, offshore and onshore. Remember though, the buck stops at the top.

No, just a 15 year engineering vet in the oilfield service company sector who understands the bottom-line impact and the criticality excellent safety leadership can have on a company. Also, having a father who retired as Director of HSE from COP doesn't hurt either.