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The Battle of Gettysburg - 157th Anniversary | Day One - Afternoon Phase | July 1, 1863
Posted on 7/1/20 at 4:42 pm
Posted on 7/1/20 at 4:42 pm
MID-DAY LULL
As Major General Oliver O. Howard, commanding officer of the Eleventh Corps, arrived on the scene south of Gettysburg, he cast his eye on an imposing hill dotted on its summit by a small cemetery. He and his aides ascended to the summit and could not help but admire the imposing position it presented to the surrounding area.
“This is a good position.” Howard finally offered.
“General, this is the only position.” Came the reply from one of his staff officers.
And so it was Howard, not Buford or Reynolds, who was the first officer to publicly recognize the strategic importance of Cemetery Hill. So enamored by the hill’s defensive possibilities, Howard would make the decision to hold one of the Eleventh Corps divisions in reserve atop Cemetery Hill while the rest of the corps advanced to the north to face the looming threat from the Confederates from that direction.
After the death of Reynolds that morning, Howard was the ranking general on the field. He took command of both the First and Eleventh Corps, passing command of the Eleventh to Brigadier General Carl Schurz. Howard now sent urgent requests for reinforcements to the Third Corps under Major General Daniel E. Sickles in Emmitsburg and the Twelfth Corps under Major General Henry W. Slocum advancing from the east on the Baltimore Pike. Sickles rogered up and replied that he was on his way. Slocum, however, refused to acknowledge Howard’s authority and awaited word from Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, before moving toward Gettysburg.
Speaking of Meade, at present he was at his headquarters in Taneytown, Maryland when word reached him from Reynolds of action at Gettysburg. The message imparted to the commanding general was that Reynolds had ordered the First Corps into action with the Eleventh Corps right behind. It was also implied by Reynolds that the army make for Gettysburg with all possible speed.
This definitely threw Meade through a loop. As of that morning, July 1, Meade was making preparations to pull the army back to the defensive line around Pipe Creek in the hopes of luring Lee into a battle there. Now his most trusted lieutenant was recommending scrapping those plans and instead moving the front to Gettysburg. While Meade was still deciphering this latest development, another courier arrived from Gettysburg with the news of the Confederate repulse, Reynolds’s death and the assumption of Howard to command of the field. The courier also spoke of Howard’s request to Sickles and Slocum to bring their commands to Gettysburg.
Events were spiraling quickly out of control and the situation seemed to be changing dramatically by the second. Not succumbing to emotion or panic, Meade remained calm and resolute in the face of the growing crisis. While still not willing to give up his Pipe Creek plan altogether, and decided to remain in Taneytown for the time being, Meade did take a crucial step in the journey toward making Gettysburg the place of decision for the campaign. The Second Corps of Major General Winfield S. Hancock had arrived that morning in Taneytown as ordered. Meade both knew and trusted Hancock and thus gave his friend written instructions to go to Gettysburg, take command of the field from Howard, and advise him on whether or not Gettysburg was the place to fight. It was now 1:30 PM.
Meanwhile, Robert E. Lee was just as in the dark as his opposite number was this day. He had heard the distant boom of the guns as he advanced eastward beside Longstreet’s column. Lee left Longstreet and rode ahead to Cashtown where he encountered A.P. Hill. His Third Corps commander seemed to be just as in the dark as Lee was, explaining to him that he had ordered his men forward that morning on a reconnaissance and supply gathering expedition. Clearly something had gone wrong as they were all under strict orders to avoid contact with the enemy that day. Lee left Hill on the side of the rode and continued eastward toward Gettysburg. He arrived on Herr Ridge shortly after noon to face a distraught Henry Heth who promptly explained his actions that morning.
Lee was definitely frustrated with his subordinate but kept his cool and even listened calmly as he recommended an immediate attack. By this time Heth’s entire division had arrived on the field. Also on the field by now was the fellow Third Corps division of Major General William Dorsey Pender. He also had word from his scouts that Major General Robert Rodes’s division of Ewell’s Second Corps would soon be arriving on the field from the north. With Heth, Pender, and Rodes – some 22,000 men in all – the Confederate forces on the field could easily sweep aside the Union soldiers positioned on McPherson’s Ridge.
The commanding general could definitely see the logic in Heth’s argument, but he was still entirely unsure exactly what he was facing. The Union forces he could see in front of him and the Union forces that were on the way to the field were two entirely different beasts. He did not feel comfortable ordering an attack without knowing the true disposition of the enemy’s forces. For that he needed Stuart but Stuart was currently missing in action. He also felt somewhat uncomfortable going forward with an assault without his entire army present on the field.
“Not yet.” was Lee’s reply to Heth’s recommendations for an attack. Events were soon to transpire, however, that would negate Lee’s decision.
The Situation - July 1, 1863 (12:30 PM)
As Major General Oliver O. Howard, commanding officer of the Eleventh Corps, arrived on the scene south of Gettysburg, he cast his eye on an imposing hill dotted on its summit by a small cemetery. He and his aides ascended to the summit and could not help but admire the imposing position it presented to the surrounding area.
“This is a good position.” Howard finally offered.
“General, this is the only position.” Came the reply from one of his staff officers.
And so it was Howard, not Buford or Reynolds, who was the first officer to publicly recognize the strategic importance of Cemetery Hill. So enamored by the hill’s defensive possibilities, Howard would make the decision to hold one of the Eleventh Corps divisions in reserve atop Cemetery Hill while the rest of the corps advanced to the north to face the looming threat from the Confederates from that direction.
After the death of Reynolds that morning, Howard was the ranking general on the field. He took command of both the First and Eleventh Corps, passing command of the Eleventh to Brigadier General Carl Schurz. Howard now sent urgent requests for reinforcements to the Third Corps under Major General Daniel E. Sickles in Emmitsburg and the Twelfth Corps under Major General Henry W. Slocum advancing from the east on the Baltimore Pike. Sickles rogered up and replied that he was on his way. Slocum, however, refused to acknowledge Howard’s authority and awaited word from Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, before moving toward Gettysburg.
Speaking of Meade, at present he was at his headquarters in Taneytown, Maryland when word reached him from Reynolds of action at Gettysburg. The message imparted to the commanding general was that Reynolds had ordered the First Corps into action with the Eleventh Corps right behind. It was also implied by Reynolds that the army make for Gettysburg with all possible speed.
This definitely threw Meade through a loop. As of that morning, July 1, Meade was making preparations to pull the army back to the defensive line around Pipe Creek in the hopes of luring Lee into a battle there. Now his most trusted lieutenant was recommending scrapping those plans and instead moving the front to Gettysburg. While Meade was still deciphering this latest development, another courier arrived from Gettysburg with the news of the Confederate repulse, Reynolds’s death and the assumption of Howard to command of the field. The courier also spoke of Howard’s request to Sickles and Slocum to bring their commands to Gettysburg.
Events were spiraling quickly out of control and the situation seemed to be changing dramatically by the second. Not succumbing to emotion or panic, Meade remained calm and resolute in the face of the growing crisis. While still not willing to give up his Pipe Creek plan altogether, and decided to remain in Taneytown for the time being, Meade did take a crucial step in the journey toward making Gettysburg the place of decision for the campaign. The Second Corps of Major General Winfield S. Hancock had arrived that morning in Taneytown as ordered. Meade both knew and trusted Hancock and thus gave his friend written instructions to go to Gettysburg, take command of the field from Howard, and advise him on whether or not Gettysburg was the place to fight. It was now 1:30 PM.
Meanwhile, Robert E. Lee was just as in the dark as his opposite number was this day. He had heard the distant boom of the guns as he advanced eastward beside Longstreet’s column. Lee left Longstreet and rode ahead to Cashtown where he encountered A.P. Hill. His Third Corps commander seemed to be just as in the dark as Lee was, explaining to him that he had ordered his men forward that morning on a reconnaissance and supply gathering expedition. Clearly something had gone wrong as they were all under strict orders to avoid contact with the enemy that day. Lee left Hill on the side of the rode and continued eastward toward Gettysburg. He arrived on Herr Ridge shortly after noon to face a distraught Henry Heth who promptly explained his actions that morning.
Lee was definitely frustrated with his subordinate but kept his cool and even listened calmly as he recommended an immediate attack. By this time Heth’s entire division had arrived on the field. Also on the field by now was the fellow Third Corps division of Major General William Dorsey Pender. He also had word from his scouts that Major General Robert Rodes’s division of Ewell’s Second Corps would soon be arriving on the field from the north. With Heth, Pender, and Rodes – some 22,000 men in all – the Confederate forces on the field could easily sweep aside the Union soldiers positioned on McPherson’s Ridge.
The commanding general could definitely see the logic in Heth’s argument, but he was still entirely unsure exactly what he was facing. The Union forces he could see in front of him and the Union forces that were on the way to the field were two entirely different beasts. He did not feel comfortable ordering an attack without knowing the true disposition of the enemy’s forces. For that he needed Stuart but Stuart was currently missing in action. He also felt somewhat uncomfortable going forward with an assault without his entire army present on the field.
“Not yet.” was Lee’s reply to Heth’s recommendations for an attack. Events were soon to transpire, however, that would negate Lee’s decision.
The Situation - July 1, 1863 (12:30 PM)
2
Posted on 7/1/20 at 4:42 pm to RollTide1987
EWELL GETS THE BALL ROLLING
Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell was in his first campaign as a corps commander. And heading into July 1, 1863, he was having a brilliant rookie outing. He had fought and won a battle at Middleburg (June 17-19), managed to capture wagonloads of supplies for the army, and had been in a position to capture the capital of Pennsylvania before being recalled by Lee once it became obvious the Union army was moving north. On the evening of June 30, he received instructions from Lee to move toward Gettysburg or Cashtown as circumstances dictated.
That July 1 morning, Ewell was on his way to Cashtown when a courier from Hill informed him that the Third Corps was advancing on Gettysburg that morning. Ewell re-routed his line of march and, with the division of Robert Rodes in the lead, the Second Corps advanced on Gettysburg from the north. The lead elements of Rodes’s division began arriving on the field shortly after noon – right around the time Lee began conferring with Heth on Herr Ridge.
At just over 8,000 men strong, Rodes’s division was the largest in the Army of Northern Virginia. His force quickly occupied Oak Hill, a position that dominated the northern portion of the battlefield. From this position, Rodes overlooked the portion of the field that Cutler and Davis had fought over just two hours beforehand. The dead and wounded from that fight still carpeted the ground. From this position, it appeared that Rodes could roll up the right flank of the Union position. However, he was still under orders from Lee not to engage until the army was concentrated. Despite the fighting that had taken place here earlier, those orders still stood.
As the Confederate Second Corps began arriving on the field from the north, the Union Eleventh Corps began arriving on the field from the south. The entirety of the First Corps was in position west of town and Howard wanted to extend their line from McPherson’s Ridge north to Oak Ridge and Oak Hill. However, the arrival of Rodes atop Oak Hill blunted those plans. So it was Howard’s intention to position the Eleventh Corps north of town in an area known as the Plains of Gettysburg. The ground here was flat, wide open, and offered very little in the way of defense.
Howard made a difficult situation even more difficult to the Eleventh Corps when he ordered the division of Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr to remain in reserve atop Cemetery Hill. At 9,200 men, the Eleventh Corps was already the smallest of the seven Union infantry corps in the Army of the Potomac. With the removal of von Steinwehr’s division, the corps would now have fewer than 8,000 men to defend a line much too big for one corps to handle, let alone the smallest corps in the army.
From his position atop Oak Hill, Ewell watched as the Eleventh Corps streamed out of Gettysburg and formed into line of battle and advanced northward. While Howard was merely intending the Eleventh Corps to remain on the defense, Ewell had no way of knowing that. The Confederate general interpreted this advance by a sizable Union force as an aggressive movement. With this in mind, Ewell determined that Lee’s order to avoid contact with the enemy was no longer valid. The Union army was about to attack and he, being aggressive-minded, was going to preempt the attack with an attack of his own.
He turned to Rodes and ordered his subordinate to launch an immediate attack. The Battle of Gettysburg was now minutes away from escalating from a minor altercation into a major battle. It was almost 2:00 PM.
THE ATTACK OF ROBERT RODES
When Rodes was ordered by Ewell to make his assault on the right flank of the Union army’s First Corps position, he went forward with his assignment heavily outnumbering his opponent. But he also went ahead with the attack believing the right of the First Corps position was the brigade of Lysander Cutler. What he could not see was an additional brigade of infantry under the command of Brigadier General Henry Baxter that lay in wait, facing north, along the Mummasburg Road. Baxter’s men lay hidden behind a stonewall awaiting the Confederate onslaught.
Rodes initially had three brigades at his disposal: Georgians under the command of Brigadier General Edward Doles, Alabamians under the command of Brigadier General Edward O’Neal, and North Carolinians under the command of Colonel Alfred Iverson. Doles was left in reserve on Rodes’s left flank to await the arrival of Major General Jubal Early’s division, while the brigades of O’Neal and Iverson were slated to make the main assault. For whatever reason there was poor coordination between the two units and the attacks went in piecemeal.
O’Neal advanced first, across the grounds of the McLean Farm, and immediately came under fire of Baxter’s men as well as the Eleventh Corps brigade of Colonel George von Amsberg. Two batteries of artillery under the leadership of Captain Hubert Dilger and Lieutenant William Wheeler laid waste to the left flank of O’Neal’s attack. Within minutes the Alabamians were put to flight by the intense volume of fire.
A far worse fate awaited the attacking North Carolinians of Iverson’s brigade. For whatever reason, O’Neal failed to warn Iverson of the awaiting brigade of Baxter and Iverson failed to do even the most basic of reconnaissance work prior to the assault, even failing to deploy skirmishers in the front of his attack force. As the advancing Confederates advanced across the open plain separating their jump off point from the hidden Union positions on Oak Ridge, the men in blue held their fire almost until the last possible second. When Iverson’s men had advanced within 100 yards, Baxter’s brigade rose from the stone wall in which they hid behind. A sheet of flame and smoke erupted into the face of the North Carolinians. Before the Rebels could gather themselves, another volley ripped into their lines, dropping scores of men.
A portion of Baxter’s brigade charged with bayonets afixed into the field, crashing into the stunned survivors, killing and wounding more men and taking dozens of prisoners. What was left of the attacking Confederates retreated as quickly as they could back to their jump off position. Within a matter of minutes, Iverson’s brigade had been virtually destroyed. Of the 1,350 men who had made the assault, only 550 were present for roll call that evening.
Rodes was stunned but undaunted. Refusing to accept defeat he ordered up the brigades of Brigadier General Dodson Ramseur and Brigadier General Junius Daniel. Ramseur attacked first, striking at where Baxter’s brigade had been positioned before the previous attack. However, Baxter’s brigade – exhausted and ammunition – had been removed from the line and replaced by the brigade of Brigadier General Gabriel Paul. Ramseur’s attack was ferocious and Paul was made permanently blind by a bullet that passed through both temples. Nevertheless, Paul’s line – with the assistance of von Amsberg’s brigade on his right – held up against the onslaught.
Daniel’s attack would cross the field to the southwest and strike the Union line close to where the railroad cut fighting had been earlier in the day. At this point in the day, the area was defended by the brigade of Colonel Roy Stone – the Pennsylvania “Bucktails.” The fighting raged as Stone’s brigade defended the south side of the Chambersburg Pike from aggressive assaults by the men under Daniel’s command, eventually forcing Daniel’s brigade to fall back.
Rodes Attacks - July 1, 1863 (2:00 PM)
Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell was in his first campaign as a corps commander. And heading into July 1, 1863, he was having a brilliant rookie outing. He had fought and won a battle at Middleburg (June 17-19), managed to capture wagonloads of supplies for the army, and had been in a position to capture the capital of Pennsylvania before being recalled by Lee once it became obvious the Union army was moving north. On the evening of June 30, he received instructions from Lee to move toward Gettysburg or Cashtown as circumstances dictated.
That July 1 morning, Ewell was on his way to Cashtown when a courier from Hill informed him that the Third Corps was advancing on Gettysburg that morning. Ewell re-routed his line of march and, with the division of Robert Rodes in the lead, the Second Corps advanced on Gettysburg from the north. The lead elements of Rodes’s division began arriving on the field shortly after noon – right around the time Lee began conferring with Heth on Herr Ridge.
At just over 8,000 men strong, Rodes’s division was the largest in the Army of Northern Virginia. His force quickly occupied Oak Hill, a position that dominated the northern portion of the battlefield. From this position, Rodes overlooked the portion of the field that Cutler and Davis had fought over just two hours beforehand. The dead and wounded from that fight still carpeted the ground. From this position, it appeared that Rodes could roll up the right flank of the Union position. However, he was still under orders from Lee not to engage until the army was concentrated. Despite the fighting that had taken place here earlier, those orders still stood.
As the Confederate Second Corps began arriving on the field from the north, the Union Eleventh Corps began arriving on the field from the south. The entirety of the First Corps was in position west of town and Howard wanted to extend their line from McPherson’s Ridge north to Oak Ridge and Oak Hill. However, the arrival of Rodes atop Oak Hill blunted those plans. So it was Howard’s intention to position the Eleventh Corps north of town in an area known as the Plains of Gettysburg. The ground here was flat, wide open, and offered very little in the way of defense.
Howard made a difficult situation even more difficult to the Eleventh Corps when he ordered the division of Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr to remain in reserve atop Cemetery Hill. At 9,200 men, the Eleventh Corps was already the smallest of the seven Union infantry corps in the Army of the Potomac. With the removal of von Steinwehr’s division, the corps would now have fewer than 8,000 men to defend a line much too big for one corps to handle, let alone the smallest corps in the army.
From his position atop Oak Hill, Ewell watched as the Eleventh Corps streamed out of Gettysburg and formed into line of battle and advanced northward. While Howard was merely intending the Eleventh Corps to remain on the defense, Ewell had no way of knowing that. The Confederate general interpreted this advance by a sizable Union force as an aggressive movement. With this in mind, Ewell determined that Lee’s order to avoid contact with the enemy was no longer valid. The Union army was about to attack and he, being aggressive-minded, was going to preempt the attack with an attack of his own.
He turned to Rodes and ordered his subordinate to launch an immediate attack. The Battle of Gettysburg was now minutes away from escalating from a minor altercation into a major battle. It was almost 2:00 PM.
THE ATTACK OF ROBERT RODES
When Rodes was ordered by Ewell to make his assault on the right flank of the Union army’s First Corps position, he went forward with his assignment heavily outnumbering his opponent. But he also went ahead with the attack believing the right of the First Corps position was the brigade of Lysander Cutler. What he could not see was an additional brigade of infantry under the command of Brigadier General Henry Baxter that lay in wait, facing north, along the Mummasburg Road. Baxter’s men lay hidden behind a stonewall awaiting the Confederate onslaught.
Rodes initially had three brigades at his disposal: Georgians under the command of Brigadier General Edward Doles, Alabamians under the command of Brigadier General Edward O’Neal, and North Carolinians under the command of Colonel Alfred Iverson. Doles was left in reserve on Rodes’s left flank to await the arrival of Major General Jubal Early’s division, while the brigades of O’Neal and Iverson were slated to make the main assault. For whatever reason there was poor coordination between the two units and the attacks went in piecemeal.
O’Neal advanced first, across the grounds of the McLean Farm, and immediately came under fire of Baxter’s men as well as the Eleventh Corps brigade of Colonel George von Amsberg. Two batteries of artillery under the leadership of Captain Hubert Dilger and Lieutenant William Wheeler laid waste to the left flank of O’Neal’s attack. Within minutes the Alabamians were put to flight by the intense volume of fire.
A far worse fate awaited the attacking North Carolinians of Iverson’s brigade. For whatever reason, O’Neal failed to warn Iverson of the awaiting brigade of Baxter and Iverson failed to do even the most basic of reconnaissance work prior to the assault, even failing to deploy skirmishers in the front of his attack force. As the advancing Confederates advanced across the open plain separating their jump off point from the hidden Union positions on Oak Ridge, the men in blue held their fire almost until the last possible second. When Iverson’s men had advanced within 100 yards, Baxter’s brigade rose from the stone wall in which they hid behind. A sheet of flame and smoke erupted into the face of the North Carolinians. Before the Rebels could gather themselves, another volley ripped into their lines, dropping scores of men.
A portion of Baxter’s brigade charged with bayonets afixed into the field, crashing into the stunned survivors, killing and wounding more men and taking dozens of prisoners. What was left of the attacking Confederates retreated as quickly as they could back to their jump off position. Within a matter of minutes, Iverson’s brigade had been virtually destroyed. Of the 1,350 men who had made the assault, only 550 were present for roll call that evening.
Rodes was stunned but undaunted. Refusing to accept defeat he ordered up the brigades of Brigadier General Dodson Ramseur and Brigadier General Junius Daniel. Ramseur attacked first, striking at where Baxter’s brigade had been positioned before the previous attack. However, Baxter’s brigade – exhausted and ammunition – had been removed from the line and replaced by the brigade of Brigadier General Gabriel Paul. Ramseur’s attack was ferocious and Paul was made permanently blind by a bullet that passed through both temples. Nevertheless, Paul’s line – with the assistance of von Amsberg’s brigade on his right – held up against the onslaught.
Daniel’s attack would cross the field to the southwest and strike the Union line close to where the railroad cut fighting had been earlier in the day. At this point in the day, the area was defended by the brigade of Colonel Roy Stone – the Pennsylvania “Bucktails.” The fighting raged as Stone’s brigade defended the south side of the Chambersburg Pike from aggressive assaults by the men under Daniel’s command, eventually forcing Daniel’s brigade to fall back.
Rodes Attacks - July 1, 1863 (2:00 PM)
Posted on 7/1/20 at 4:42 pm to RollTide1987
HETH RENEWS HIS ASSAULT
At about 2:30 PM, with Rodes’s division in mid-attack, Lee finally gave way to Heth’s wish to attack the Union lines on McPherson’s Ridge one more time. This time Heth attacked with the Virginians of Colonel John Brockenbrough and the North Carolinians of Brigadier General J. Johnston Pettigrew. Pettigrew’s brigade, the largest in the Army of Northern Virginia, would earn their stripes this day as their path of advance put them squarely on a collision course of the Iron Brigade.
Brockenbrough’s small brigade would perform rather poorly against the Unionites under Stone and elements of the Iron Brigade. It would be up to Pettigrew’s men to push the Union soldiers off of McPherson’s Ridge and out of the Herbst Woods. Pettigrew overlapped the extreme left of the 19th Indiana and pushed the Iron Brigade back with its sheer strength in numbers. The fighting was intense, however, particularly between the 24th Michigan and the 26th North Carolina – the deadliest regiment-on-regiment fight of the entire battle. The 26th North Carolina took 839 men into the Herbst Woods that afternoon. When they came out the other side – only 212 remained. The 24th Michigan was equally devastated, losing 399 of its 496 men in its fight with the 26th North Carolina.
Stone and Meredith were soon in full retreat toward Seminary Ridge. The brigade of Colonel Chapman Biddle, who had taken over from the drunken Brigadier General Thomas Rowley that afternoon, was positioned to the left of the Iron Brigade and ended up retreating with them as they were soon swept away by the advance of Heth’s victorious troops.
Heth’s division, however, was in ruins and could not complete the assault against the Union units that were now reforming for a last stand on Seminary Ridge. What was more, Heth himself had been seriously wounded by a bullet to the head that knocked him unconscious for the next 24 hours. It is believed that the stuffing in his oversized hat was the only thing that saved him from an early death.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS
Right around the time Heth’s division was driving the First Corps off of McPherson’s Ridge, the situation on the Union right was becoming quite precarious. Already under-strengthed, over-stretched, and dangerously exposed, matters were made worse for the Eleventh Corps when Brigadier General Francis Barlow unilaterally moved his division forward to a knoll that he felt would deprive the enemy of an artillery platform to be used against his lines. This exposed position, however, was well north of the other Eleventh Corps division – that of Brigadier General Alexander Schimmelfennig.
Within minutes, Barlow’s undersized division was under a direct assault from that of Major General Jubal Early’s Confederates. The brigade of Brigadier General John B. Gordon smashed right through the center of Barlow’s lines while the brigades of Brigadier General Harry Hays and Brigadier General Isaac Avery swung around the exposed right flank of Barlow’s position. Barlow was felled with a severe wound as his line began to fall apart all around him. Within minutes the extreme right of the Union position at Gettysburg had collapsed.
Schimmelfennig watched in horror as Barlow’s division disintegrated before his eyes. Soon his men became the targets of a deadly crossfire from the batteries of Robert Rodes on Oak Hill and those of Jubal Early now firing from the knoll just vacated by Barlow’s men. As he tried to realign his men to face Early’s advance, the Georgians of Doles’s brigade slammed into his formations. Early’s division hit Schimmelfennig’s division squarely on the right flank and rolled up his line from right to left.
Soon the entire Eleventh Corps was in full retreat toward town. The 157th New York of von Amsberg’s brigade made a suicidal counterattack that cost them 75% of their numbers, but slowed down the Confederate advance for several crucial minutes.
Howard, watching the flight of his corps from the heights of Cemetery Hill, ordered the 800 men of Colonel Charles Coster’s brigade to advance and provide cover for the retreating divisions of Barlow and Schimmelfennig. Coster formed his line just north of town in Kuhn’s brickyard and was soon swamped by the brigades of Hays and Avery. But his stand provided the Eleventh Corps vital time to complete their escape at the cost of more than half of Coster’s men – of which 313 were taken prisoner.
By 4:00 PM, the collapse of the Eleventh Corps was complete. Of the 7,800 men defending the fields north of Gettysburg, some 3,200 were made casualties (more than 1,400 were taken prisoner).
THE FINAL ASSAULT ON SEMINARY RIDGE
As the Eleventh Corps met its destiny on the Plains of Gettysburg, things were about to reach a climax on the western side of town. Robert Rodes renewed his assault on the northern end of the First Corps’ line, this time with a bit more coordination. The brigades of Daniel, Ramseur, and O’Neal struck at Baxter and Paul simultaneously. The latter brigades, exhausted and running low on men and ammunition, eventually had to beat a hasty retreat. Their retreat also forced Cutler to withdraw, clearing out all Federal troops north of the Chambersburg Pike.
This left just those stubborn soldiers of William Wadsworth’s division to handle on Seminary Ridge. Defending behind hastily constructed breastworks in front of the Lutheran Seminary, these tired of still game Union soldiers prepared to receive the Confederate attack. Making the assault would be Dorsey Pender’s division. The approach would not be an easy one as about a half mile of open ground separated the two lines.
The brigade of Brigadier General Alfred Scales would lead the assault against Seminary Ridge. Advancing against breastworks as well as a concentrated “super battery” of 20 pieces of artillery, Scales watched in horror as his brigade was virtually annihilated in just a matter of minutes. Of the 1,400 men he sent into the battle, just 500 men and one officer emerged uninjured. Further south, the brigade of Brigadier General Abner Perrin had more success by cunningly exploiting a 50-yard gap between Biddle’s left flank and Buford’s cavalry units that were in the process of pinning down the brigade of Brigadier General James Lane.
Perrin broke through the gap and enveloped Biddle’s brigade while the remnants of Scales’s brigade kept the Iron Brigade and Stone’s brigade pinned down. Finally, facing pressure from front, flank, and rear, the stubborn men of the First Corps finally collapsed and went into full retreat back toward the town. The exhausted survivors of Pender’s division didn’t even bother to launch a pursuit.
Seminary Ridge - July 1, 1863 (4:00 PM)
At about 2:30 PM, with Rodes’s division in mid-attack, Lee finally gave way to Heth’s wish to attack the Union lines on McPherson’s Ridge one more time. This time Heth attacked with the Virginians of Colonel John Brockenbrough and the North Carolinians of Brigadier General J. Johnston Pettigrew. Pettigrew’s brigade, the largest in the Army of Northern Virginia, would earn their stripes this day as their path of advance put them squarely on a collision course of the Iron Brigade.
Brockenbrough’s small brigade would perform rather poorly against the Unionites under Stone and elements of the Iron Brigade. It would be up to Pettigrew’s men to push the Union soldiers off of McPherson’s Ridge and out of the Herbst Woods. Pettigrew overlapped the extreme left of the 19th Indiana and pushed the Iron Brigade back with its sheer strength in numbers. The fighting was intense, however, particularly between the 24th Michigan and the 26th North Carolina – the deadliest regiment-on-regiment fight of the entire battle. The 26th North Carolina took 839 men into the Herbst Woods that afternoon. When they came out the other side – only 212 remained. The 24th Michigan was equally devastated, losing 399 of its 496 men in its fight with the 26th North Carolina.
Stone and Meredith were soon in full retreat toward Seminary Ridge. The brigade of Colonel Chapman Biddle, who had taken over from the drunken Brigadier General Thomas Rowley that afternoon, was positioned to the left of the Iron Brigade and ended up retreating with them as they were soon swept away by the advance of Heth’s victorious troops.
Heth’s division, however, was in ruins and could not complete the assault against the Union units that were now reforming for a last stand on Seminary Ridge. What was more, Heth himself had been seriously wounded by a bullet to the head that knocked him unconscious for the next 24 hours. It is believed that the stuffing in his oversized hat was the only thing that saved him from an early death.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS
Right around the time Heth’s division was driving the First Corps off of McPherson’s Ridge, the situation on the Union right was becoming quite precarious. Already under-strengthed, over-stretched, and dangerously exposed, matters were made worse for the Eleventh Corps when Brigadier General Francis Barlow unilaterally moved his division forward to a knoll that he felt would deprive the enemy of an artillery platform to be used against his lines. This exposed position, however, was well north of the other Eleventh Corps division – that of Brigadier General Alexander Schimmelfennig.
Within minutes, Barlow’s undersized division was under a direct assault from that of Major General Jubal Early’s Confederates. The brigade of Brigadier General John B. Gordon smashed right through the center of Barlow’s lines while the brigades of Brigadier General Harry Hays and Brigadier General Isaac Avery swung around the exposed right flank of Barlow’s position. Barlow was felled with a severe wound as his line began to fall apart all around him. Within minutes the extreme right of the Union position at Gettysburg had collapsed.
Schimmelfennig watched in horror as Barlow’s division disintegrated before his eyes. Soon his men became the targets of a deadly crossfire from the batteries of Robert Rodes on Oak Hill and those of Jubal Early now firing from the knoll just vacated by Barlow’s men. As he tried to realign his men to face Early’s advance, the Georgians of Doles’s brigade slammed into his formations. Early’s division hit Schimmelfennig’s division squarely on the right flank and rolled up his line from right to left.
Soon the entire Eleventh Corps was in full retreat toward town. The 157th New York of von Amsberg’s brigade made a suicidal counterattack that cost them 75% of their numbers, but slowed down the Confederate advance for several crucial minutes.
Howard, watching the flight of his corps from the heights of Cemetery Hill, ordered the 800 men of Colonel Charles Coster’s brigade to advance and provide cover for the retreating divisions of Barlow and Schimmelfennig. Coster formed his line just north of town in Kuhn’s brickyard and was soon swamped by the brigades of Hays and Avery. But his stand provided the Eleventh Corps vital time to complete their escape at the cost of more than half of Coster’s men – of which 313 were taken prisoner.
By 4:00 PM, the collapse of the Eleventh Corps was complete. Of the 7,800 men defending the fields north of Gettysburg, some 3,200 were made casualties (more than 1,400 were taken prisoner).
THE FINAL ASSAULT ON SEMINARY RIDGE
As the Eleventh Corps met its destiny on the Plains of Gettysburg, things were about to reach a climax on the western side of town. Robert Rodes renewed his assault on the northern end of the First Corps’ line, this time with a bit more coordination. The brigades of Daniel, Ramseur, and O’Neal struck at Baxter and Paul simultaneously. The latter brigades, exhausted and running low on men and ammunition, eventually had to beat a hasty retreat. Their retreat also forced Cutler to withdraw, clearing out all Federal troops north of the Chambersburg Pike.
This left just those stubborn soldiers of William Wadsworth’s division to handle on Seminary Ridge. Defending behind hastily constructed breastworks in front of the Lutheran Seminary, these tired of still game Union soldiers prepared to receive the Confederate attack. Making the assault would be Dorsey Pender’s division. The approach would not be an easy one as about a half mile of open ground separated the two lines.
The brigade of Brigadier General Alfred Scales would lead the assault against Seminary Ridge. Advancing against breastworks as well as a concentrated “super battery” of 20 pieces of artillery, Scales watched in horror as his brigade was virtually annihilated in just a matter of minutes. Of the 1,400 men he sent into the battle, just 500 men and one officer emerged uninjured. Further south, the brigade of Brigadier General Abner Perrin had more success by cunningly exploiting a 50-yard gap between Biddle’s left flank and Buford’s cavalry units that were in the process of pinning down the brigade of Brigadier General James Lane.
Perrin broke through the gap and enveloped Biddle’s brigade while the remnants of Scales’s brigade kept the Iron Brigade and Stone’s brigade pinned down. Finally, facing pressure from front, flank, and rear, the stubborn men of the First Corps finally collapsed and went into full retreat back toward the town. The exhausted survivors of Pender’s division didn’t even bother to launch a pursuit.
Seminary Ridge - July 1, 1863 (4:00 PM)
Posted on 7/1/20 at 4:42 pm to RollTide1987
THE UNION RETREAT
To their dying breaths, the men of the First and Eleventh Corps would argue about who retreated first. No one really knows who collapsed first though it’s generally agreed today by historians that it doesn’t really matter as both units probably broke at about the same time. But in the moment reputation was everything. And Howard did everything he could to save his by blaming Doubleday and the First Corps for the retreat. Howard got to Meade first with his version of events and, as a result, Doubleday was relieved of command of the First Corps on the field in place of John Newton – a division commander from the Sixth Corps. Doubleday, who probably had his best day of the war on July 1, never recovered in his career and he begrudged Howard until his dying day.
The Union soldiers who defended Seminary Ridge to the last retreated in good order through town. The First Corps men who retreated from atop Oak Ridge had a far more difficult time of it and many men from Cutler’s, Baxter’s, and Paul’s commands were taken prisoner in the ensuing retreat. The men of the Eleventh Corps retreated through town, clogging the streets in varying states of calmness and panic. Hundreds of soldiers became lost in the city, resulting in either being captured or having to hide in basements, backyards, and even outhouses.
As the survivors of the First Corps and Eleventh Corps ascended Cemetery Hill just south of town, they were confronted by the sight of Major General Winfield S. Hancock – commander of the Second Corps. He had arrived at Gettysburg in the aftermath of the Union retreat and had given Howard Meade’s written order stating that Hancock was now in command of the field. Howard, Hancock’s senior, was not happy about the arrangement but begrudgingly followed his commanding general’s order. The two generals began to rally and reform the battered and beaten men of the first day’s Battle of Gettysburg on the crest of Cemetery Hill.
THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
The Union army had done just about everything right on July 1, 1863. Their demise was due not to poor generalship but the overwhelming disparity in numbers on the field that afternoon. The Confederates deployed 27,000 men at Gettysburg that first day, compared to the Union’s 17,000. Despite the inferior numbers, the Union soldiers held off ferocious, if uncoordinated, attacks for much of the day. They displayed a fighting ability and spirit that took their Confederate counterparts completely by surprise. In other battles, these Union soldiers most likely would have succumbed much more quickly. Here at Gettysburg, however, they stood their ground against overwhelming odds.
The first day of the Battle of Gettysburg tends to get overlooked due to the savage fighting and heavy casualties sustained on day two and the pageantry and heroism of Pickett’s Charge on day three. July 1, 1863, however, was one of the bloodiest days of the war by itself. Over the course of the ten hours or so of combat, the two armies suffered a combined 16,000 casualties. For comparison, 22,500 men fell on September 17, 1862, at Antietam – the bloodiest day in American history.
July 1 was also significant because it directly led to the decisions both commanders would make over the next two days. But that is the story for my next few posts.
To their dying breaths, the men of the First and Eleventh Corps would argue about who retreated first. No one really knows who collapsed first though it’s generally agreed today by historians that it doesn’t really matter as both units probably broke at about the same time. But in the moment reputation was everything. And Howard did everything he could to save his by blaming Doubleday and the First Corps for the retreat. Howard got to Meade first with his version of events and, as a result, Doubleday was relieved of command of the First Corps on the field in place of John Newton – a division commander from the Sixth Corps. Doubleday, who probably had his best day of the war on July 1, never recovered in his career and he begrudged Howard until his dying day.
The Union soldiers who defended Seminary Ridge to the last retreated in good order through town. The First Corps men who retreated from atop Oak Ridge had a far more difficult time of it and many men from Cutler’s, Baxter’s, and Paul’s commands were taken prisoner in the ensuing retreat. The men of the Eleventh Corps retreated through town, clogging the streets in varying states of calmness and panic. Hundreds of soldiers became lost in the city, resulting in either being captured or having to hide in basements, backyards, and even outhouses.
As the survivors of the First Corps and Eleventh Corps ascended Cemetery Hill just south of town, they were confronted by the sight of Major General Winfield S. Hancock – commander of the Second Corps. He had arrived at Gettysburg in the aftermath of the Union retreat and had given Howard Meade’s written order stating that Hancock was now in command of the field. Howard, Hancock’s senior, was not happy about the arrangement but begrudgingly followed his commanding general’s order. The two generals began to rally and reform the battered and beaten men of the first day’s Battle of Gettysburg on the crest of Cemetery Hill.
THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
The Union army had done just about everything right on July 1, 1863. Their demise was due not to poor generalship but the overwhelming disparity in numbers on the field that afternoon. The Confederates deployed 27,000 men at Gettysburg that first day, compared to the Union’s 17,000. Despite the inferior numbers, the Union soldiers held off ferocious, if uncoordinated, attacks for much of the day. They displayed a fighting ability and spirit that took their Confederate counterparts completely by surprise. In other battles, these Union soldiers most likely would have succumbed much more quickly. Here at Gettysburg, however, they stood their ground against overwhelming odds.
The first day of the Battle of Gettysburg tends to get overlooked due to the savage fighting and heavy casualties sustained on day two and the pageantry and heroism of Pickett’s Charge on day three. July 1, 1863, however, was one of the bloodiest days of the war by itself. Over the course of the ten hours or so of combat, the two armies suffered a combined 16,000 casualties. For comparison, 22,500 men fell on September 17, 1862, at Antietam – the bloodiest day in American history.
July 1 was also significant because it directly led to the decisions both commanders would make over the next two days. But that is the story for my next few posts.
Posted on 7/1/20 at 4:47 pm to RollTide1987
Posted on 7/1/20 at 4:57 pm to RollTide1987
Is it offensive to talk about the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg since it was a victory for the Army of Northern Virginia?
Posted on 7/1/20 at 5:15 pm to Roll Tide Ravens
quote:
e first day of the Battle of Gettysburg since it was a victory for the Army of Northern Virginia?
Was it though? Forced to fight on ground they didn't choose. Didn't get the high ground, it's a stalemate if you ask me
Posted on 7/1/20 at 5:21 pm to RollTide1987
If it’s not a Southern victory, I don’t want to hear it, and if it isn’t one, it should be. 
Reminds me of the tour guide pointing out the window...... Ladies and Gentlemen, over to your right is this battlefield and the south won that one, and over to the left is another battle the south won, and up yonder is another battle the south won” One of the tourists asked, “Sir, seeing the North won the war, isn’t there any of these battles that the North won?” Tour guide responds “Not while I’m running this tour bus”
Reminds me of the tour guide pointing out the window...... Ladies and Gentlemen, over to your right is this battlefield and the south won that one, and over to the left is another battle the south won, and up yonder is another battle the south won” One of the tourists asked, “Sir, seeing the North won the war, isn’t there any of these battles that the North won?” Tour guide responds “Not while I’m running this tour bus”
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