The Battle of Gettysburg - 157th Anniversary | Day One - Noctem | July 1-2, 1863

“I SELECT THIS AS THE BATTLEFIELD”

When Major General Winfield S. Hancock left Union army headquarters in the early afternoon of July 1, 1863, he had been given written orders from the general commanding, George Meade, to take command of the field upon arriving at Gettysburg. When he trotted onto the field that afternoon, he did so just in time to receive the remnants of the First and Eleventh Corps falling back to Cemetery Hill. He calmed them, rallied them, and began to reorganize them to receive the inevitable Confederate assault.

Hancock took Major General Oliver O. Howard, the commanding officer of the Eleventh Corps and current ranking general on the field, aside and showed him the order Meade had given him to take command despite Howard being Hancock’s senior. Howard was not happy with the order but grudgingly accepted it and allowed Hancock to take control of the situation. Both men did a good job of reorganizing the defeated Union soldiers and placing the artillery. All the while Hancock cast a critical eye on the surrounding landscape.

Meade had wanted the army to fight along Pipe Creek in Maryland, but after the events that had just transpired in and around Gettysburg, that might no longer be possible. Hancock kept this in mind as he surveyed the terrain and came to the conclusion that Gettysburg was just as good a place as any to fight a pitched battle. Hancock returned to Howard to discuss with him his conclusions: “I think this is the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle I ever saw.”

Howard could not disagree. The ground seemed tailor made for combat in his estimation. “Very well, sir, I select this as the battlefield.” Hancock’s decision was the final one on the matter, yet it was merely the affirmation of what Buford, Reynolds, and Howard had come to believe before him. Hancock sent a courier back to Meade informing him of his recommendation. Pipe Creek should be abandoned. The army would sink or swim at Gettysburg.

“IF PRACTICABLE”

Robert E. Lee could see the defensive potential of the new Union position as plain as day. Cemetery Hill was wide open and perfect for use as an artillery platform. From that position the Union army could command all of the surrounding terrain. Sending a courier to find Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell, the commander of the Second Corps, he sent with him an order for Ewell to take Cemetery Hill if he deemed it practicable. But then came the major caveat: Ewell would only attack if he could avoid bringing on a general engagement before the rest of the army was up.

This last part of the order seems to get lost in the shuffle of Ewell’s failure to take Cemetery Hill, but it surely was enough of a contradiction for him to mouth “What the f***?!” in exasperation. Eying Cemetery Hill through his field glasses, it was obvious to him that no assault on the position could be made without bringing on a general engagement. That was where the Union infantry and artillery were presently reforming!

His command was also exhausted. Rodes’s division had been mauled northwest of town and Early’s was scattered all over Gettysburg rounding up prisoners and trying to make their way back to their commands through the confusing layout of the city streets. Major General Edward Johnson’s division would be arriving soon but Ewell felt like he needed help from A.P. Hill’s Third Corps if he had a prayer of actually carrying the position. Hill, however, refused to help claiming his corps was too depleted.

Ewell then contemplated an assault on neighboring Culp’s Hill, which would have made Cemetery Hill untenable if successfully taken, but Jubal Early nixed the idea due to reports of the Union Twelfth Corps arriving in their rear via the York Pike. Ewell hastily sent two brigades to block the perceived threat but Early still urged caution and insisted they await the arrival of Johnson’s division before doing anything. Johnson arrived just after dark and his division maneuvered itself east of town in preparation for taking Culp’s Hill. When a scouting party went forward and attacked the slope, they were sent stumbling back by a volley of rifle fire from the 7th Indiana. This encounter convinced the Confederates under Johnson to abandon the effort and Culp’s Hill remained in Union hands. At that particular time, the 7th Indiana was the only Union regiment in position on that hill.

THE ARMIES ASSEMBLE

All through the night of July 1 and into the early morning hours of July 2, the various pieces of both armies began to come together at Gettysburg. For the Union army, the Third Corps under Major General Daniel E. Sickles was the first unit to arrive after the fighting on the first day had ended. It was soon followed by Winfield S. Hancock’s own Second Corps. The Twelfth Corps of Major General Henry Slocum arrived from the east via the Baltimore Pike (not the York Pike as the Confederates had feared) followed soon after by the Fifth Corps of Major General George Sykes. By dawn on July 2, only the Sixth Corps under Major General John Sedgwick was a significant distance from the battlefield.

Major General George G. Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, arrived on the battlefield shortly after midnight. He set up his headquarters in the Leister House at the base of the eastern slope of Cemetery Ridge, right off the Taneytown Road. He could not see the ground and thus relied upon his generals to brief him on what the terrain looked like. Upon the conclusion of the briefing, Meade was satisfied that his subordinates had picked a good position to fight a battle.

Across the no-man’s-land from Cemetery Ridge, Confederate forces began to assemble on the slopes of Seminary Ridge. Major General Richard Anderson’s division was the last piece of the puzzle to arrive for A.P. Hill’s Third Corps and the arrival of Edward Johnson’s division meant that the Second Corps was fully assembled on the field as well. Lieutenant General James Longstreet, commander of the First Corps, arrived on the field that evening but wouldn’t have any of his troops on the field until after sun up on July 2.

That evening Lee had resolved to attack the Union army come morning but was unsure of how to do it. Longstreet was opposed to any attack, arguing the terrain favored the Union army, and instead recommended they re-deploy the army somewhere further south, preferably ground of their own choosing between the Army of the Potomac and Washington. Lee considered the idea dangerous due to the fact that they lacked any intelligence on the location of the rest of the Army of the Potomac. He also felt uncomfortable making such a move in the face of an enemy without cavalry support and Stuart was still MIA.

Ewell argued that an attack on his front would be too costly so Lee ruled out an offensive against Cemetery Hill. Thus it was decided that Longstreet would make the main assault. The only question was how and where….

END OF DAY ONE.