re: 737max crashes in Ethiopia. Killing 157

I think this will only get worse for Boeing, with the potential to get catastrophically worse.

From the WaPo: LINK

quote:

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In October 2017, Brazilian regulators flew to Miami to test out the brand-new Boeing 737 Max 8. The team scrutinized the sleek new jetliner’s flight systems and soon published a list of over 60 operational changes, from landing systems to cockpit displays, that Brazilian pilots would need to learn.

Among the new features regulators said pilots would have to familiarize themselves with was the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, a safety system that could nose the plane downward if it sensed a potential stall.

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quote:

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In those same months, the Federal Aviation Administration was making its final revision to a 53-page report that would make up the backbone of Max 8 training guidelines for pilots across the United States and in almost every other country around the world.

It did not once mention the anti-stall system, according to a copy reviewed by The Post. In fact, the FAA report suggested pilots would experience nothing surprising in the cockpit of the new Max 8. In a section where FAA test pilots are supposed to list “unique handling or performance characteristics” of new planes, they remarked that there were none: “no specific flight characteristics,” the report read.

FAA’s publication of pilot training requirements for the Max 8 in the fall of 2017 was among the final steps in a multiyear approval process carried out under the agency’s now 10-year-old policy of entrusting Boeing and other aviation manufacturers to certify that their own systems comply with U.S. air safety regulations.

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And here’s a good twitter thread re: Boeing’s software fix to a solution that isn’t a software problem to begin with: LINK

Again, to summarize the problem: in order to produce a “new” plane for a new marker as quickly and cheaply as possible, Boeing needed to put these big new modern engines on a 50 year-old 737 hull design they’re not compatible with. The result is a plane with poor physical design (engines too far up and front) that will push the plane’s nose too far up in certain situations, leading to a stall.

So the only way to get the thing certified is installing a computer to counter the poor physical design by automatically trimming the nose down without the pilot’s inout or knowledge when the instrument senses this situation. Problem is the instrument can sense this situation when that situation isn’t occurring, making the plane crash itself while the pilots are pulling up on the yoke with all their might (and this is another topic on its own: how the hell did Boeing approve a computer that set can trim so extreme as to negate and overpower all other input from the pilot?!?!)

But here’s the other deal: once you start limiting the MCAS activation, now you risk increasing the probability of the original problem it was meant to solve (nose too high/stalling)

My original point remains: this plane never should have been built. Pilots (and passengers) shouldn’t have to rely on software and sensors (especiallly non-redundant) to fix a problem inherent in the plane’s physical design, especially when that physical design flaw is due to stretching the limits of a hull design too far.

I fly a lot and have no fear of it, but I won’t be flying on a Max any time soon, if ever.