re: How were German armored divisions so much more elite than their US counterparts

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When you take into account, they tended to overengineer - using the wonderful Maybach engine to power Panthers and Tigers was the equivalent of putting a Rolls Royce into taxi service -

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German production balance and focus was a little all over the place until around 1943. This was partially a result of the fact that open rearmament was not begun until 1935, partially a result of hesitation on the part of the state leadership to shift Germany to a total war footing, and partially indecision on what direction was the best to go in terms of production strategy. Germany was not prepared for a war of this magnitude in 1939, and there is little question about that. The addition of Speer as Armaments Minister after Todt's death was a landmark moment in turning around Germany's production situation. In respect to armor specifically, Guderian's assignment as Inspector General likewise marked a significant improvement and consistent strategy for maximizing armor resources for the war effort. The situation was disadvantageous all around.

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Well, war was long regarded as Germany's national sport. The Prussian elite, going back to Frederick the Great and before, had done little but war and prepare for war for 8 to 10 centuries. The closest to a modern Sparta as we had, in that respect.

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Certainly there is a strong Prussian military tradition but I think this is largely overblown in respect to Germany's situation in WWII. Prussia was simply a state in Germany (granted a significant one) at this time and a portion of it residing in Poland at the war's start. It's military tradition was certainly still in existence but tradition itself meant very little in the modern era of warfare.

The British and French military traditions and quantitative experiences in the 20th, 19th, and 18th centuries were certainly on par, and even more so, with greater Germany. American military tradition and organization had likewise become world class and warfare by WWII had far transcended the days where mere soldierly organization, tradition, and culture could triumph. Material resources, production, technology, innovation, and coordination with the entire state economy relegated military tradition and culture itself as a much less important factor in military victory. There's a popular notion that the Germans were far more warlike and bellicose than their neighbors, but the immediate historical period preceding WWII really didn't indicate this to be true and I don't believe such a notion could at all explain the German resolve and performance in WWII.

Aside from the absolute mutual barbarity and ideologically motivated war taking place on the Eastern Front which naturally promoted conditions for resistance at all costs, I think it was the culturally promoted will and spirit of resistance combined with the commonly noted German propensity for tremendous engineering and soldiering that was most significant. Say what you will about the Nazi government, but they expertly cultivated this spirit of will prior to and during the course of the war. Hitler himself emphasized the importance of will and was convinced that it was the breaking of German will and morale on the home front that cost them WWI. This focus on maintaining the people's will and morale is largely attributed to the Nazi leadership's reluctance to shift Germany onto total war footing until 1943, so it was a double edged sword of sorts.

I'd also point to FDR's foolish decision at Casablanca to demand unconditional surrender as the only recourse for peace. This essentially cemented the absolute unity of fate amongst all Germans and their institutions with the Nazi government.