Triggerduckman

If the Ivy League ever accepted NIL in a formal, organized way, it would look very different from Utah-style PE deals, and in many respects more attractive to sophisticated investors, despite (or because of) the Ivies’ constraints.

Below is a realistic framework for what private-equity involvement in Ivy League athletics would look like if NIL were allowed, and why the New York / Northeast geography is the real asset.

1. Why Ivy League Is a Different PE Target Than Utah

Utah’s deal (and similar Big 12 / ACC concepts) are about:
• Cash flow replacement (TV money shortfalls)
• Facility upgrades
• Roster retention

The Ivy League would be about:
• Brand monetization, not wins
• Audience monetization, not championships
• Lifetime network value, not recruiting battles

In PE terms:

Power-5 Model Ivy League Model
Revenue driven by wins Revenue driven by brand
High player turnover Lifetime alumni engagement
Cost inflation arms race Cost discipline
Regional fandom Global elite affinity

That distinction matters enormously to institutional capital.

2. Likely PE Structure (If NIL Were Allowed)

A. League-Wide Commercial Vehicle (Most Likely)

Rather than school-by-school deals, PE would insist on a central Ivy League NIL & MediaCo, because:
• Uniform academic and eligibility rules
• Comparable brand equity
• Collective bargaining power
• Reduced reputational risk

Structure:
• Ivy League forms a for-profit subsidiary (or licenses rights to one)
• PE acquires a minority stake (10–25%)
• Term: 15–25 years
• Returns via revenue share, not control

This mirrors European football league media vehicles, not U.S. athletic departments.

B. What PE Would Actually Be Buying

Not teams.

Not athletes.

They’d be buying rights to monetize attention.

Assets packaged:
• NIL aggregation rights (opt-in athletes)
• Digital media rights (non-linear streaming)
• Documentary & access content
• International distribution
• Sponsorship inventory tied to Ivy brand
• Data & CRM access (anonymized but powerful)

3. NIL Economics in the Ivy Context

A. Athlete NIL ? Pay-to-Play

Ivy NIL would skew toward:
• Finance
• Consulting
• Tech
• Law
• Policy
• Media
• Global NGOs

Think internships + endorsements + content, not collectives buying quarterbacks.

Typical NIL deal might be:
• Goldman / McKinsey / Blackstone content partnerships
• Thought-leadership sponsorships
• Founder-led startups leveraging athlete-ambassadors
• International luxury brands wanting Ivy credibility

This is high-margin, low-volume NIL, which PE prefers.

B. Athlete Profile Is the Product

Ivy athletes are:
• Camera-ready
• Credentialed
• Multilingual
• Global
• “Safe brands”

That dramatically lowers reputational risk—one of PE’s biggest NIL concerns elsewhere.

4. Media & Streaming: Where the Real Money is.

A. Northeast / NYC Advantage

The Ivy League sits inside:
• New York
• Boston
• Philadelphia
• DC corridor

That means:
• High CPM advertising
• Finance & luxury sponsors
• International viewership
• Corporate rather than mass-market audience

This is not SEC Saturday football.
This is Bloomberg-style sports media.

B. Streaming Over Linear TV

PE would push:
• Direct-to-consumer Ivy League platform
• Bundled with:
• Alumni access
• Academic content
• Student-athlete stories
• Historic archives
• Premium pricing, smaller audience, higher ARPU

Think: “The Criterion Collection of college sports.”

5. Why Ivy Presidents Would Still Hesitate

Even with all that upside, resistance would remain because:
1. Mission creep
Athletics becoming revenue-seeking conflicts with academic primacy.
2. Title IX optics
PE capital magnifies scrutiny.
3. Governance risk
External capital always wants scale and growth.
4. Endowment optics
“Why monetize sports when we have $50B endowments?”

Ironically, that last point makes PE even more interested.

6. Estimated Economics (Conservative)

If allowed and executed properly:
• League-wide NIL & media revenue:
$300–600M annually within 10 years
• PE minority valuation:
$2–4B enterprise value
• PE returns driven by:
• International expansion
• Streaming multiples
• Brand licensing

This would not resemble NIL chaos elsewhere—it would look like luxury brand management.

7. Bottom Line

If the Ivy League ever accepted NIL:
• It would instantly become the most sophisticated NIL market in the country
• Private equity would view it as:
• Low risk
• High margin
• Long duration
• Brand-protected
• The Northeast geography + global alumni base is the real moat

The irony is: The Ivy League is perfectly positioned for NIL and PE precisely because it doesn’t need them.

It may happen.

…as I’ve said, no more student section. Private equity will demand the sale of all seats be optimized, including the student section. It’s happening.

I could have said nothing about ChatGPT but I did not. The degree to which some of you react almost violently to any comment is pretty sad. The name calling is immature and there is no place where it should be acceptable to do so, and particularly in a public forum like this. You need a good mouth washing.

I’m going to say the quiet part out loud:
There is no logical reason anymore for a “student section” in college stadiums, and students should have to purchase tickets just like the general public.

For decades we justified student sections with the idea that college athletics exist for the students, that amateurism and the “student-athlete” model made football an extension of campus life.

But that world is gone. Completely gone.

With NIL, the transfer portal, pay-for-play collectives, and roster bidding wars, we’ve all accepted—whether we admit it or not—that college athletics is now a commercial entertainment product, no different in economic structure than minor-league football with university branding.

If the fiction of “this is about the student body” has been abandoned by everyone involved—coaches, universities, media, and especially the players—then why are we still clinging to the idea that students deserve a huge chunk of free or heavily subsidized seats?

Those seats have actual value.
They are paid for by everybody except the students.
And we keep pretending that the “student atmosphere” is some sacred tradition that justifies the cost.

Meanwhile, NIL collectives are begging fans for donations to pay players multimillion-dollar deals. Universities are raising ticket prices and seat licenses on the very people who fund the sport. But students still get prime seating at a fraction of the cost because of a rationale that no longer exists.

If we’re now openly in a professionalized system:
• Why should students get better seats than paying fans?
• Why should the public subsidize their gameday experience when the entire model is now business-driven?
• Why are we pretending that football revenue exists “for the students” when university administrators themselves admit NIL is the new economic engine?

If college football is a business, treat it like one.

Let students buy tickets on the open market, the same as everyone else. If they want to sit together and create a “student-section atmosphere,” great—buy the seats and sit in the same place. But the era of free or artificially cheap student seats is out of sync with the reality of what college athletics has become.

We can keep the traditions that still make sense.
But let’s stop pretending that the old amateur-model perks apply in the NIL era.

Time to modernize: No more student sections. Open market for all seats.

ChatGPT assisted.

You will not pass the bar exam.

I would think that the larger contracts involve some kind of performance bond or insurance as a fallback in the event of the risk of non performance or inability to execute the obligations in the contract.

I ignored Southeastern. An obvious statistical outlier not even remotely relavent.

I can attest that acceptance into the tiger band fraternity in 1974 involved lots of alcohol, sex acts, sheep, extreme sleep deprivation, prostitutes, drugs, public nudity (remember streaking was a big thing back then), partial drowing, and I’m sure I’m forgetting a few.

Vat 69 and Tab

I see I see in the future kick backs from the players to coaches for playing time, joint endorsement deals. This will not be good.

Harvard University (MA) $40,929,700,000 2
Yale University (CT) $30,295,003,000 4 (tie)
Stanford University (CA) $27,699,834,000 6 (tie)
Princeton University (NJ) $25,623,600,000 1
Massachusetts Institute of Technology $17,443,750,000 4 (tie)
University of Pennsylvania $14,649,761,000 8
Texas A&M University $12,632,092,945 66 (tie)
University of Michigan—Ann Arbor $12,273,834,000 24 (tie)
University of Notre Dame (IN) $11,565,964,000 19
Columbia University (NY) $10,950,738,000 3

LSU $546.02 million This is why LSU is fricked under this new scheme of athletic operations. More NCAA restrictions will fall given the precedent set by this case. Those rankings are of the college’s prestige and standing in academics. My two daughters graduated from Columbia and one played volleyball there. I’m not saying any of the Ivies will jump ship and become independents like Notre Dame, etc., but they all have the financial ability to do so and to compete for the best athelets, but its possible. I’m more worried about Texas A & M out pacing LSU given the disparity in their endowment balances.