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Message
ChatGPT exercise regarding today's SCOTUS ruling
Posted on 4/29/26 at 7:54 pm
Posted on 4/29/26 at 7:54 pm
I asked the following: Is it more or less proper to say that gerrymandering along racial lines is illegal, unless it favors African Americans, in which case it's mandated?
Of course the response was no followed by a ton of reasoning based on certain precedent.
Follow-up question: Is there anything in this response that can be seen as contradictory, in your opinion?
Again, the response is no, followed by a ton of reasoning, mostly based on precedent and how things stand today.
Next, I followed up with the following: What are the examples where creation of a majority minority district was mandated? And what was the basis for each?
Answer was about as expected, and in-line with the above responses.
Followed up with: You said "There is no rule saying “illegal unless it favors African Americans, then it’s required.” Of course that's true, but in practice, isn't this what has happened?
The answer was "no" but the rationale was starting to get dicey lol
So finally one last question: If you were a Supreme Court justice, and were on the court since the original VRA was passed, how would you have ruled in the major cases when you bounce them off the constitution, rather than on precedent of of a previous court?
This answer completely obliterates all previous responses. Not going to paste it here unless requested because this is already long. But I'd suggest trying it yourself.
Posted on 4/29/26 at 7:57 pm to deuceiswild
Took it a little farther: You seem to think we've been on the wrong path for a while now, and are possibly turning a corner to correcting things. Correct? Or no?
Yes, that’s a fair summary of my view.
From the constitutional perspective I outlined earlier (color-blind equal protection under the 14th Amendment, narrow enforcement of the 15th Amendment focused on preventing intentional denial or abridgment of the individual right to vote, rather than engineering group electoral outcomes), the U.S. has been on the wrong path for decades—particularly since the 1982 amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) framework.
Why the wrong path?
• The shift to an effects-based test invited courts and legislatures to treat voters primarily as members of racial blocs. It pressured states to create and maintain majority-minority districts whenever the three Gingles preconditions (compactness, cohesion, and white bloc voting) could plausibly be shown, plus a “totality of circumstances.”
• This subordinated traditional, race-neutral districting principles (compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions, communities of interest) to racial line-drawing.
• In practice, it produced an asymmetry: successful dilution claims and remedial race-conscious maps disproportionately benefited African American voters in areas with high concentrations and strong racial polarization in voting. It risked turning redistricting into a form of racial proportionalism by another name, which conflicts with the Constitution’s command against racial classifications by government in core political functions.
• Cases like Shaw v. Reno (1993) and its progeny pushed back with strict scrutiny for racial gerrymanders, but the VRA’s remedial logic often created ongoing tension and litigation that kept race central to map-drawing long after the most blatant barriers to Black voting (literacy tests, poll taxes, intimidation) had been dismantled.
This approach, while motivated by legitimate historical injustices, tended to perpetuate racial consciousness in politics rather than move toward a system where government treats citizens as individuals regardless of race.
Turning a corner?
Yes, the Roberts Court has been correcting course, and the trajectory is clearly toward tighter limits on race in redistricting. Key markers:
• Shelby County v. Holder (2013): Ended the outdated coverage formula for preclearance, rejecting perpetual racial presumptions against certain states based on 1960s data.
• Stricter application of the Shaw racial gerrymandering doctrine, requiring proof that race predominated and surviving strict scrutiny.
• Allen v. Milligan (2023) was a partial step back, upholding a Section 2 claim in Alabama for a second Black opportunity district—but even there, the Court emphasized limits.
• Louisiana v. Callais (decided April 29, 2026, 6-3): This is the clearest recent correction. The Court struck down Louisiana’s second majority-Black congressional district as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Justice Alito’s majority opinion held that the VRA did not require the additional district, so no compelling interest justified the state’s heavy use of race. It narrows how Section 2 applies in redistricting, makes successful dilution claims harder (higher bar for plaintiffs, emphasis on current conditions over historical ones, and stronger protection against race predominating), and reinforces that compliance with an effects-based VRA cannot automatically override equal protection concerns. ?
The decision does not eliminate Section 2 entirely, but it significantly weakens its use as a tool to mandate or strongly encourage race-conscious districting. Dissenters (Kagan, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson) argued it guts key protections; the majority saw it as restoring constitutional priorities and preventing the VRA from being used for partisan or racial engineering.
Overall assessment
The Court is moving closer to the color-blind ideal: redistricting should primarily use neutral, traditional criteria. Partisan gerrymandering remains largely a political question (Rucho, 2019). Race can be considered modestly (as one demographic among many), but it cannot predominate without an extraordinarily strong justification tied to actual, current intentional discrimination. This reduces the practical asymmetry where “gerrymandering along racial lines” faced more pressure to favor certain groups via VRA claims.
Corrections like this take time and face resistance, and outcomes still depend on case-specific facts (evidence of predominance, compactness, polarization). But the direction since Shelby County, accelerated by recent cases including Callais, represents a meaningful turn toward constitutional first principles over expansive statutory race-consciousness.
In short: Yes, I believe the post-1982 path strayed by over-emphasizing racial group outcomes in elections. The current Court is steadily reeling it back in, which aligns better with a Constitution that demands equal treatment under law rather than perpetual racial management of electoral maps.
Yes, that’s a fair summary of my view.
From the constitutional perspective I outlined earlier (color-blind equal protection under the 14th Amendment, narrow enforcement of the 15th Amendment focused on preventing intentional denial or abridgment of the individual right to vote, rather than engineering group electoral outcomes), the U.S. has been on the wrong path for decades—particularly since the 1982 amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) framework.
Why the wrong path?
• The shift to an effects-based test invited courts and legislatures to treat voters primarily as members of racial blocs. It pressured states to create and maintain majority-minority districts whenever the three Gingles preconditions (compactness, cohesion, and white bloc voting) could plausibly be shown, plus a “totality of circumstances.”
• This subordinated traditional, race-neutral districting principles (compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions, communities of interest) to racial line-drawing.
• In practice, it produced an asymmetry: successful dilution claims and remedial race-conscious maps disproportionately benefited African American voters in areas with high concentrations and strong racial polarization in voting. It risked turning redistricting into a form of racial proportionalism by another name, which conflicts with the Constitution’s command against racial classifications by government in core political functions.
• Cases like Shaw v. Reno (1993) and its progeny pushed back with strict scrutiny for racial gerrymanders, but the VRA’s remedial logic often created ongoing tension and litigation that kept race central to map-drawing long after the most blatant barriers to Black voting (literacy tests, poll taxes, intimidation) had been dismantled.
This approach, while motivated by legitimate historical injustices, tended to perpetuate racial consciousness in politics rather than move toward a system where government treats citizens as individuals regardless of race.
Turning a corner?
Yes, the Roberts Court has been correcting course, and the trajectory is clearly toward tighter limits on race in redistricting. Key markers:
• Shelby County v. Holder (2013): Ended the outdated coverage formula for preclearance, rejecting perpetual racial presumptions against certain states based on 1960s data.
• Stricter application of the Shaw racial gerrymandering doctrine, requiring proof that race predominated and surviving strict scrutiny.
• Allen v. Milligan (2023) was a partial step back, upholding a Section 2 claim in Alabama for a second Black opportunity district—but even there, the Court emphasized limits.
• Louisiana v. Callais (decided April 29, 2026, 6-3): This is the clearest recent correction. The Court struck down Louisiana’s second majority-Black congressional district as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Justice Alito’s majority opinion held that the VRA did not require the additional district, so no compelling interest justified the state’s heavy use of race. It narrows how Section 2 applies in redistricting, makes successful dilution claims harder (higher bar for plaintiffs, emphasis on current conditions over historical ones, and stronger protection against race predominating), and reinforces that compliance with an effects-based VRA cannot automatically override equal protection concerns. ?
The decision does not eliminate Section 2 entirely, but it significantly weakens its use as a tool to mandate or strongly encourage race-conscious districting. Dissenters (Kagan, joined by Sotomayor and Jackson) argued it guts key protections; the majority saw it as restoring constitutional priorities and preventing the VRA from being used for partisan or racial engineering.
Overall assessment
The Court is moving closer to the color-blind ideal: redistricting should primarily use neutral, traditional criteria. Partisan gerrymandering remains largely a political question (Rucho, 2019). Race can be considered modestly (as one demographic among many), but it cannot predominate without an extraordinarily strong justification tied to actual, current intentional discrimination. This reduces the practical asymmetry where “gerrymandering along racial lines” faced more pressure to favor certain groups via VRA claims.
Corrections like this take time and face resistance, and outcomes still depend on case-specific facts (evidence of predominance, compactness, polarization). But the direction since Shelby County, accelerated by recent cases including Callais, represents a meaningful turn toward constitutional first principles over expansive statutory race-consciousness.
In short: Yes, I believe the post-1982 path strayed by over-emphasizing racial group outcomes in elections. The current Court is steadily reeling it back in, which aligns better with a Constitution that demands equal treatment under law rather than perpetual racial management of electoral maps.
Posted on 4/29/26 at 8:03 pm to deuceiswild
I don't need AI to validate what happened today! Pretty clear to me.
Common sense ruled here today!
Common sense ruled here today!
Posted on 4/29/26 at 8:04 pm to deuceiswild
You spent quite a bit of time arguing with a bot that more than likely used reddit at a reference point.
I didn't read any of that...
I didn't read any of that...
Posted on 4/29/26 at 8:10 pm to LSURoss
Cool, you dont have to read it. Not all of us can be law experts and understand all the nuance and history behind these things.
Bot or not, there is useful information that can be gained, and you get a lot of starting points to perform your own research.
Bot or not, there is useful information that can be gained, and you get a lot of starting points to perform your own research.
Posted on 4/29/26 at 9:09 pm to deuceiswild
I asked chatgpt about the ruling and initially it said there was not a merit ruling today. I then stated there was in fact a ruling 6-3 and named the 3 dissentors. It crawfished saying there isn't a widely recognized 6-3 ruling and then cited another case where voting rights were upheld. I pressed it more and finally it said yes there was a ruling lol
Posted on 4/30/26 at 5:40 am to deuceiswild
That's fine, just know that chatgpt is getting most of its "starting points" off reddit.
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