The Battle of Gettysburg - 157th Anniversary | Day Two - Prologue #2 | July 2, 1863

THE UNION “FISH HOOK”

On the morning of July 2, 1863, Major General George G. Meade hopped on his horse and inspected his army’s positions. For many of the men this was the first time they had ever laid eyes on their new commanding general as Meade had been in command for less than a week. As he rode down his line, he definitely approved of the natural defensive positions offered to his force. Culp’s Hill was wooded and very steep on its northeastern face – the side which faced the Confederates – and was defended now by the two divisions of the Twelfth Corps under Major General Henry W. Slocum. To the left of Culp’s Hill was the imposing Cemetery Hill, the key to Meade’s line, wide open and perfect for artillery and observation. Here the remnants of the First Corps – now under John Newton – and Howard’s Eleventh Corps positioned themselves.

The line curved south from Cemetery Hill and stretched across a low ridge line called Cemetery Ridge. Here the veteran troops of Major General Winfield S. Hancock’s Second Corps were moving into position. At present he had two more corps in reserve – Sickles’s Third and Sykes’s Fifth – ready to move into position where needed. From the air the position would have looked something like a gigantic fish hook. The position was fairly compact giving Meade’s army good interior lines to move reinforcements where needed relatively quickly.

Arriving at the southern end of his army’s position, Meade concluded that the line should be extended further south. He issued orders to Major General Daniel Sickles to move his Third Corps in position on the left of the Second Corps, thus extending the Union line to Little Round Top. Sickles obeyed and his men began moving into position sometime around mid-morning. The Fifth Corps would remain in reserve until circumstances dictated otherwise.

An illustration of Meade's fish hook line - July 2, 1863


SICKLES MAKES A DECISION

Major General Daniel E. Sickles is among the most colorful officers in the history of the United States Army. Not a West Pointer, Sickles had made his name as a powerful U.S. senator from the state of New York. In 1859, he caused a national sensation when he murdered Philip Barton Key – son of Francis Scott Key – in Lafayette Square across from the White House. Key had been engaged in an affair with Sickles’s wife. The subsequent court room drama was the O.J. Simpson trial of its day, capturing the imagination of the public at large. Sickles was ultimately found not guilty by reasons of temporary insanity – the first time in the history of U.S. jurisprudence that defense was utilized.

At the outbreak of war he had made use of his charisma and political connections to raise an entire brigade of troops for the cause. As a result, he was made a brigadier general of volunteers. Now, two years later, he held the rank of major general and commanded an entire corps of Union infantry – the only non-West Pointer to hold such a command in the Army of the Potomac. Due to being an outsider as well as carrying a reputation as a sleazy politician, Sickles wasn’t liked or respected by most in the army’s high command. His men, however, absolutely adored him and he personally held their safety and well-being in high regard.

Which is why he began to have serious reservations about the position assigned to him in the Union defense line this July 2, 1863. His Third Corps had slid into line to the left of Hancock’s men but the terrain in front of his position was nowhere near as inviting as the rest of the army’s was. And what really worried him was a position more than a half mile to his front that stuck out like a sore thumb. It was a slight rise, somewhat higher than his own position, that was surrounded by open ground and was crowned by a peach orchard. Such a position, if occupied by the Rebels, would provide them an artillery platform that could potentially pulverize his line.

Visions of Hazel Grove at the Battle of Chancellorsville began to dance around in his head. A natural artillery platform, Sickles was ordered to abandon it on the third day of battle and pull his men back to Fairview. Confederate artillery moved into Hazel Grove and wreaked havoc on his lines that morning. He did not want a repeat of that and so began to send clarification requests back to Meade’s headquarters as to the limitations of the orders given him. In short, he wanted to know if his orders allowed him to occupy what would become known to history as the Peach Orchard.

Meade had little time for Sickles’s games as he was presently concerned with the build up of Confederate troops in front of Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill. A successful lodgment at either location could put the entire Union position in jeopardy. Meade instead sent Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, chief of artillery, down to Sickles to see about the placement of his men and any other questions that Sickles might have. Hunt was asked his opinion by Sickles on the opportunities afforded by a hypothetical occupation of the Peach Orchard, to which Hunt agreed it would make a fine place to install artillery.

Hunt, however, stopped short of endorsing such an occupation when Sickles asked if he thought his orders allowed for such a move. After Hunt departed from Sickles, the political general decided that he would take matters into his own hands. These West Pointers had absolutely no idea what they were doing! He would show them how it was done.

The men of the Second Corps watched in wonderment as those of the Third marched out in front of them, bands playing, flags waving, in perfect columns, to the Peach Orchard. It didn’t take a military scholar to immediately note the dangers Sickles had now placed in corps in. For one, his force numbered just under 10,000 men. His original line was only 1,600 yards long. His orders called for him to cover Hancock’s left while extending the army’s flank to Little Round Top. In order to do that, he would have to stretch his lines significantly. As a result, the front the Third Corps occupied was now 3,500 yards long. What’s worse, his line failed to connect with Hancock and ended just short of covering Little Round Top – so he was operating outside the realm of his orders to boot.

His line, unconnected as it was with the rest of the Army of the Potomac, was now a giant salient that could be attacked from multiple different angles. It was an inviting target that surely be annihilated if attacked by a large contingent of troops. And at that particular moment, 14,000 men of the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia were marching his way to do just that….

Sickles - Before and After (July 2, 1863)