re: How were German armored divisions so much more elite than their US counterparts

The Imperial German High Seas Fleet had an elite naval tradition. It was an elite and crack force in all aspects of surface naval warfare in 1916.

I don't know what you mean by "no real naval tradition" because at Jutland, the German High Seas Fleet was probably a better fighting force than the British Grand Fleet.

Again, it was all scuttled after the war and the High Seas Fleet rests at the bottom of the North Sea.

But, until late 1917 or so, the German Navy's surface fleet was NOT to be trifled with -- they were elite.

The story of naval surface warfare in The Great War is very fascinating, because it is the classic struggle between British quantity against German quality.

The high level of professional excellence achieved by the Imperial German Navy between 1871 and 1918 is an astounding story. We will recall that Germany was "born" in 1871.

Didn't intend to hi jack the thread, but, the question posed by the OP has been answered.

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Jutland was less than 25 years before WW2 started, whereas the U.S. Navy had at least 125 years behind it, and the Royal Navy, hundreds of years.

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Germany did not exist until 1871, so, it would be impossible for Germany to have a naval tradition as lengthy in years as either the US Navy ( founded 1775) or the Royal Navy ( founded in the 16th century ).

I did not understand your point about naval tradition. Qualitatively speaking during The Great War years until 1918, the Imperial German Navy was probably the best in the world, even though its naval tradition dated back only decades, rather than centuries. So, the lack of centuries of naval tradition did not prevent the Imperial German Navy from being as good as or maybe better in some ways than anybody.

Of course, once the final year of the Great War dragged on, the Imperial German Navy deteriorated and eventually mutinied just before the war's end.

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They did inflict more damage by raw numbers at Jutland

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Yes, there's a reason for that. The Imperial German High Seas fleet was a little bit better than the Grand Fleet at Jutland in 1916. That's why the British fleet lost more ships at Jutland.

The British fleet was not well-trained for night combat. The German fleet was. This helped the German fleet return to harbor during the night phase of Jutland.

And the German fleet did sortie in strength again after Jutland, but, Jutland was the final fleet action of The Great War.

LINK

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So much very bad info in this thread.

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I think it was a good discussion. We've had some debates, but I don't think anybody put out anything that was just flat out wrong - just arguable.

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was among the most informed and knowledgable persons on WWII armor

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Thanks and likewise.

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So much very bad info in this thread.

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Yes, why don't you tell us more about your genius-level knowledge about this stuff?

I'm pretty sure that you are not as half as knowledgeable as you believe yourself to be.

I'm sure that both Rommel and Guderian studied campaigns and tactics from the US Civil War and most other wars.

IMHO, the most important lesson that they always practiced and might have learned from Forrest, Mosby and Stonewall is the lesson that the Commander must be at the point of decision. He must be personally present at the decisive action point in order to influence the events with minimum delay.

IMHO, that was a key component of Rommel's and Guderian's method of warmaking. They did not sit in the rear at Army Headquarters and try to give orders to the front line battalions from that remote site. Instead, they got in a command vehicle and drove to the front line battalions in order to observe and issue orders on the spot.

Rommel liked to use a small single engine recon airplane of a type called "Storch" to fly over his advancing columns. When he spotted a unit at the halt instead of advancing, he was known to have the pilot land the plane to see what was up, and why the unit was advancing. Commanders under Rommel knew that they had better "macht schnell."

It was a dangerous way to command, and, as we know, this is how Stonewall was killed -- leading from the front.

PS The book that Rommel wrote is titled "Infantry Attacks." The book is about Rommel's time as an infantry commander during The Great War. Rommel's book is not about armor war or panzers. On the other hand, the book IS indeed about the importance of a Commander's personal presence at the decisive point of action. Rommel practiced this principle from his time as a new Lieutenant.

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Most over rated tank of the war.

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I'd really like to hear your reasoning for this statement.

Tiger I was not "state of the art" by late 1944. The Tiger I design did not include modern sloped armor. Tiger I was a design that was completed in the latter part of 1942, so, it did not include design features of the latest tanks seen in late 1944 and 1945.

The Tiger II was a powerful tank, but, it was quite under-powered, so, it did not go anywhere fast, and it could not travel to strategic breakthrough distances in great numbers, not that the Germans had them in any great numbers because they did not.

Tiger II was not invulnerable. Anti tank guns that were not powerful enough to penetrate the frontal armor of the Tiger II could still get a flank or rear shot as the Tiger II advance, or simply shoot at it frontally and destroy/damage the Optics of the Tiger II, rendering the Tiger II somewhat more blind and less effective.

A well-hidden anti tank gun could get off a few shots without being detected to the front of a Tiger II's and its optical sighting devices. Bad optical sighting equipment means the tank can't see and shoot well.

Once any tank's ability to see and aim its weapons is degraded, it's going to have reduced combat effectiveness and will be a candidate for withdrawal for repairs, thus getting it out of the fight going on at that time.

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The Tiger II was a powerful tank, but, it was quite under-powered, so, it did not go anywhere fast, and it could not travel to strategic breakthrough distances in great numbers, not that the Germans had them in any great numbers because they did not.

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True - again that marvelous Maybach engine allowed German designers to ramp up the overall weight (~77 short tons ) with armor and a combat load of 86 rounds of 88mm - that was getting to be at the edge of even modest mobility for that platform.

And still a potent gun at the end of the war, the German 88 was not the trump card it had once been. And, you're right. Where the Panthers, Shermans and T-34s could go almost anywhere, the original Tigers were tied to the roads, so the Tiger IIs (King Tigers) were REALLY tied to the roads.

Strategic mobility was non-existent - the effort to get them to a particular battlefield meant it fought and died there - that was true of Tiger Is, as well.