re: How were German armored divisions so much more elite than their US counterparts

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"Despite highly ballyhooed emphasis on employment of mechanized forces and on rapid movement, the bulk of German combat divisions were horse drawn throughout World War II."

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As a member of the US Army Reserve, it would be remiss of me to not point out our role in the advantage the U.S. held in motorization in WWII.

Around the time of WWI - there was still horse cavalry, of course, but it was a clearly dying combat branch. The tank and armored car saved it and the branch continued doing what it was doing with the new tools. Transport (particularly tactical and operational) was still mainly horse drawn (or worse, soldiers on foot and handcarts) for many armies through WWII. The Germans were notorious for loading up the elite units with everything and leaving the filler units with the scraps.

In the United States, with the formation of the Army Reserve, there was a choice to be made - you see - every day the Good Lord sends, a horse has to eat, drink water, be groomed, walked, shoed, etc. So, the USAR could keep horses that had to be fed every day, or go with motor vehicles that only had to be fueled and maintained at irregular intervals for a reserve unit's schedule. Detroit wasn't complaining, as it was relatively young then. The regular army was small they would be damned if the reservists were all going to be motorized and they weren't, so - boom - there we were, about 30 years ahead of most other armies in that capacity.

If you like threads like this you should definitely check out Historum.com, a really good history message board.

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When you take into account, they tended to overengineer - using the wonderful Maybach engine to power Panthers and Tigers was the equivalent of putting a Rolls Royce into taxi service -

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German production balance and focus was a little all over the place until around 1943. This was partially a result of the fact that open rearmament was not begun until 1935, partially a result of hesitation on the part of the state leadership to shift Germany to a total war footing, and partially indecision on what direction was the best to go in terms of production strategy. Germany was not prepared for a war of this magnitude in 1939, and there is little question about that. The addition of Speer as Armaments Minister after Todt's death was a landmark moment in turning around Germany's production situation. In respect to armor specifically, Guderian's assignment as Inspector General likewise marked a significant improvement and consistent strategy for maximizing armor resources for the war effort. The situation was disadvantageous all around.

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Well, war was long regarded as Germany's national sport. The Prussian elite, going back to Frederick the Great and before, had done little but war and prepare for war for 8 to 10 centuries. The closest to a modern Sparta as we had, in that respect.

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Certainly there is a strong Prussian military tradition but I think this is largely overblown in respect to Germany's situation in WWII. Prussia was simply a state in Germany (granted a significant one) at this time and a portion of it residing in Poland at the war's start. It's military tradition was certainly still in existence but tradition itself meant very little in the modern era of warfare.

The British and French military traditions and quantitative experiences in the 20th, 19th, and 18th centuries were certainly on par, and even more so, with greater Germany. American military tradition and organization had likewise become world class and warfare by WWII had far transcended the days where mere soldierly organization, tradition, and culture could triumph. Material resources, production, technology, innovation, and coordination with the entire state economy relegated military tradition and culture itself as a much less important factor in military victory. There's a popular notion that the Germans were far more warlike and bellicose than their neighbors, but the immediate historical period preceding WWII really didn't indicate this to be true and I don't believe such a notion could at all explain the German resolve and performance in WWII.

Aside from the absolute mutual barbarity and ideologically motivated war taking place on the Eastern Front which naturally promoted conditions for resistance at all costs, I think it was the culturally promoted will and spirit of resistance combined with the commonly noted German propensity for tremendous engineering and soldiering that was most significant. Say what you will about the Nazi government, but they expertly cultivated this spirit of will prior to and during the course of the war. Hitler himself emphasized the importance of will and was convinced that it was the breaking of German will and morale on the home front that cost them WWI. This focus on maintaining the people's will and morale is largely attributed to the Nazi leadership's reluctance to shift Germany onto total war footing until 1943, so it was a double edged sword of sorts.

I'd also point to FDR's foolish decision at Casablanca to demand unconditional surrender as the only recourse for peace. This essentially cemented the absolute unity of fate amongst all Germans and their institutions with the Nazi government.

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The Panzer IV H&J models came out the same year as Easy Eight and had more armor and a larger gun. It was less reliable though, supposedly.

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The Panzer IV, in all of it's models, had a 75mm main gun. The Sherman Easy Eight, which first saw combat in August 1944, had a 76mm main gun. Additionally, the Easy Eight was designed to have reasonably tough armor, and, it was probably a little better armored than any Pz IV model.

While the Pzkw IV H and J models may have had more armor than earlier Pz IV models, they did not have a larger gun.

In any event, the Easy Eight was in no way inferior to any model of the German Pz IV. Remember that the Pz IV was a design that was first fielded in 1936. By late 1944, the Pz IV was obsolete. Even though the Germans created new models of Pz IV by adding more applique armor plates and such, the basic tank design could only be updated so much.

Even the US 57mm anti-tank gun that was a towed gun could crack open the frontal armor of any Pz IV. The lowly US 37mm anti tank gun could take out a Pz IV's side armor.

So, it's not accurate to say that the Easy Eight was inferior to the later models of Pz IV.

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The M1 Abrams coming online helped tremendously.

It took quite awhile to get to that point.

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Yeah, the Abrams came on line in 1980.

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Yeah, the Abrams came on line in 1980.

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Creighton Abrams was a colonel when the war in Europe concluded. Wouldn't that have been a hell of a thing?

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Hey, Abe? I guess you're going to make general - they just named a tank after you.

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You mentioned Prussia's history dating back 8 to 10 centuries

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I said 8 to 10 generations.

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why I mentioned even more recent French and British military traditions to point

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France went from inspiring/beating/ultimately succumbing to a massive international coalition, to losing to just Prussia, to getting rolled up in 6 weeks. Prussia went from kicking butt and taking names, to leading Germany against pretty much the entire world except Japan and Italy.

Britain's military tradition has been anchored on the Royal Navy for almost all of its history, going all the way back to the English tradition. I didn't denigrate the Royal Navy during WWII.

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I reject the argument all together.

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We'll just have to agree to disagree.

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Their military defeat was largely due to strategic error and a very new style of warfare of which their enemy was highly skilled and they were not.

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Now, this is true. It is almost impossible for tactical acumen to overcome strategic blunders - while strategic genius can overcome any number of tactical failures and even some operational ones.

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My rejection was of the notion of Prussian historical militarism as the reason for Germany's performance and remarkable spirit of effective resistance against what became insurmountable odds.

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And I can concede that the German people, generally, were pretty motivated for the early part of the war, and their inherent strength showed until the bitter end. Not limited to just Prussians, although it is impossible to ignore the Prussian influence on German military traditions.

Good stuff guys, good thread to read.

Question for you WWII buffs. I'm not too familiar with Germany's navy other than the U-Boat, but how different would the war have been for the US/Allies if Germany had a naval fleet along the lines of the Japanese (or the US)?

The Pacific was a cold-hearted bitch, so if we had to fight that front, while also dealing with an equally formidable navy on the other front, how big of a difference would that have made? It seems that Germany was pretty much all in on the U-Boat (and having good success until they had to battle a real fleet) but lacking in other departments of naval warfare (specifically battleships/aircraft carriers....at least I think..)....It would seem to me that the US at least would be stretched pretty thin in that scenario, and might not have had the impact we did. The Allies would still have won IMO, but it might have taken quite a bit longer. Did we even have carriers in the Atlantic or were they all focused on the war in the Pacific? I mean, maybe we didn't have any over there because we didn't need any over there, so we were able to focus the majority of our naval fleet on the Pacific...but if we had to split them up because we were fighting fierce wars with other carrier divisions in both oceans, things might be different?

Seriously, WWII has to be, for me, the most fascinating war ever.

Imperial Germany had a formidable fleet that actually bested the Royal Navy at Jutland in 1916.

Once The Great War was lost, the peace terms forced Germany to give up her fleet, so, it was scuttled.

Nazi Germany never had the economic capability of building a new fleet in a short time that would be able to challenge the Royal Navy and the US Navy. But, sure, if Nazi Germany had had a navy as large and powerful as Japan's or Britain's or the USA's, then, yes, that would have been tough on the Allies.

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Imperial Germany had a formidable fleet that actually bested the Royal Navy at Jutland in 1916. Once The Great War was lost, the peace terms forced Germany to give up her fleet, so, it was scuttled. Nazi Germany never had the economic capability of building a new fleet in a short time that would be able to challenge the Royal Navy and the US Navy. But, sure, if Nazi Germany had had a navy as large and powerful as Japan's or Britain's or the USA's, then, yes, that would have been tough on the Allies.

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The total loss of the entire German surface fleet at the end of WWI cannot be overstated as retarding German naval development into WWII. They literally had no fleet to play with after Versailles. And then the punitive treaty limits on naval construction coupled with horrible economic conditions in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s made any naval retooling or rebuilding very difficult. U-boats were a quick and relatively easy way to get back into the game.