re: Let's talk about military spending

quote:

---

Returning to that concept - a second Army Air Corps (whatever you call it) is not a good idea. As late as the Summer of 1940 the ground officers than ran the Army wanted to cancel the whole Flying Fortress program.

---

You argue that they shouldn't be merged because of what "almost" happened, yet the US Army Air Force was far and away the best strategic air force of the war.

The US Army also found a way to ignore tank advancements throughout the inter war period (save a few people like Patton), but no one is questioning their ability to manage tank formations. Nesting the USAF in the Army would save big money, eliminate a lot of bureaucracy, and better serve the rifle carrying PFC at the bottom and planner at the top. The history of the air force is littered with over-promising and dreamy concepts where the infantryman or sailor is irrelevant. Its too bad the revolt of the admirals didn't end where it should have, with a reconsolidation of the USAF into the Army.

quote:

---

The structure of the Luftwaffe has been seen as a macro-flaw in the German war effort. With no strategic bombers, the Germans couldn't reach any of the Russian factories turning out the T-34 tanks and other weapons whose factories had been moved far to the East.

---

After reading Champagne's post you I realized you just furthered my point.

The Luftwaffe, though separate from the German Army and Navy, still managed to neglect strategic lift and bombing. Simply having an Air Force doesn't guarantee that you're going to get the best ideas.

Needless bureaucracy does overly complicate things and prevent you from massing assets, thought, planning, etc.

Why do we need an air force separate from the Army?

quote:

---

Patton had nothing to do with the development of tanks. Ever.

---

So he had no hand in concept and doctrine development? Again, the strategic bombers somehow made it through what you describe as a merciless gauntlet for aviation ideas.

Back to the issues originally addressed in this thread, merging USAF back into the Army thins out much of the bureaucracy at the service HQ level and at the supporting establishment. It would also build powerful relationships that would allow for a future combination of units as the transition from weight in the active component to weight in the reserve component occurred.

It is just one idea that would increase effectiveness and efficiency.

quote:

---

The Luftwaffe, though separate from the German Army and Navy, still managed to neglect strategic lift and bombing. Simply having an Air Force doesn't guarantee that you're going to get the best ideas.

---

Yep. And US Army ground generals did everything they could to cancel the Flying Fortress.

REMEMBERING THE B-17 ERA: ARE WE LINDBERGH OR ANDREWS?

As DeWitt S. Copp put it in his classic study, A Few Great Captains:

Behind the welcoming crowds, the official receptions and speechmaking, the epic venture also illustrated an aeronautical axiom. The bemedaled Balbo, with massive head, glittering eye and rakish red goatee, stated it clearly when he declared in a public report to Mussolini: “The air forces can, like the navies, confront the problem of moving squadrons. With the Atlantic flight, Italy has furnished proof of these possibilities. I believe that with this aviation policy … aviation can make gigantic strides in all senses whether with reference to the improvement of machines or to the preparation of the flyers or the organization of the meteorological, logistic and technical services which are all too insufficient.”

Andrews and the Italian airmen met at a reception, and perhaps they discussed the future, for Colonel Andrews had said essentially the same thing in a paper written at the War College titled “The Airplane in National Defense.”: “We often hear about the limitations of military aviation. But, year by year, these limitations are becoming less with the improvement in airplane design and manufacturing and, more important, with the improvement in aids to navigation and piloting.”

“Many people are prone to judge our possibilities in time of war by limitations which peacetime operations impose upon us; limitations due to lack of funds for carrying out some project in its entirety. Others, whose experience in military aviation ended with the World War, can see no improvement in military aviation, but live in the past so far as the activity is concerned.”

>

Gen. Frank Andrews

LINK

General Andrews risked his career to fight for the B-17. It was he who ordered the interception of the Rex.



For his troubles, General Andrews (who it so happens was a Nashvillian) was relieved and sent to the same command that General Mitchell was sent to before his court martial.

If you think about it, you may come around to the idea that sticking the Air Force BACK into the Army is a bad idea on every level.

quote:

---

Patton had nothing to do with the development of tanks. Ever.

---

Fairly misleading. Patton never worked in the design bureau, but as early as 1919 he was working with Ike and Christie on U.S. tank development. During the build up in 1940, he met with Chaffee and made recommendations.

Your implication that Patton had nothing to do with U.S. armor development is ludicrous on its face, as he was one of the handful of proponents there from the beginning.

He is a POS who has completely de-railed what started off as a very good thread. Why? Because he is a broken down, retired Marine who has nothing better to do than copy and paste in every military related thread. He has added nothing to the discussion. And yet the admins let him do this time and time again.

quote:

---

Your implication that Patton had nothing to do with U.S. armor development is ludicrous on its face, as he was one of the handful of proponents there from the beginning.

---

Patton had his wife driving Christie's prototype. I should have mentioned that.

As I said, after the National Defense Act of 1920, he went back to the cavalry. Patton wrote many many articles about the future of armored warfare and the use of new technology generally.

If anyone could have stood up to McNair in the crucial period, it was Patton. But he did not, to my knowledge.

quote:

---

He is a POS who has completely de-railed what started off as a very good thread.

---

This is not a good thread. Relegating the Army and Air Force to some sort of Reserve/National Guard status or even substantially doing that, is a non-starter. Congress is not going to upset its own gravy train and the Defense Contractors would gum up totally any move in that direction.

I don't take the premise of this thread seriously, and even if the Congress would go for it, it is a bad idea.

quote:

---

One problem with the graphics is that you can't control the size when you post them.

---

Yes you can - I suggest that after the end of the IMG URL you add a space then "width=300" (e.g. www.tinypics.com/123456.jpg width=300) or something to that effect. Then they will all have the same width and not foul up folks browsers as badly.

quote:

---

This is not a good thread. Relegating the Army and Air Force to some sort of Reserve/National Guard status or even substantially doing that, is a non-starter. Congress is not going to upset its own gravy train and the Defense Contractors would gum up totally any move in that direction. I don't take the premise of this thread seriously, and even if the Congress would go for it, it is a bad idea.

---

It is definitely a good thread because of the topic and the general principle contained in the OPs idea of a new kind of force structure. Sure, it is reasonable to have th opinion that the full details of the OP's idea won't occur in the foreseeable future, but, it is still a worthy idea, even if unlikely.

If we judge this thread to be bad, we would be discouraging future threads of this kind. We went to ENCOURAGE thread topics like this one.

Don't forget to look into my question about USMC infantry assault tactics in 1918. It would enhance my own education if you could either confirm or refute my own conclusion that the USMC's approach exactly mirrored the US Army's 1918 approach to the problem.