quote:
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the IC received numerous reports, both classified and unclassified, which provided contradictory accounts that there were demonstrations at the Temporary Mission Facility. In some cases, these intelligence reports-which were disseminated widely in the Intelligence Community--contained references to press reports on protests that were simply copied into intelligence products. Other reporting indicated there were no protests. For example, the IC obtained closed circuit television video from the Mission facility [][][][], and there were credible eyewitness statements of U.S. personnel on the ground that night, which the FBI began to collect from interviewing survivors starting on September 15, 2012, in Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

The IC also had information that there were no protests outside the Temporary Mission Facility prior to the attacks, but did not incorporate that information into its widely circulated assessments in a timely manner. Contrary to many press reports at the time, eyewitness statements by U.S. personnel indicate that there were no protests at the start of the attacks. For example, on September 15, 2012,. the CIA's Chief of Station in Tripoli sent to the then-Deputy Director of the CIA and others at the CIA an email that reported the attacks were "not/not an
escalation of protests."116 Yet, the CIA's January 4, 2013, Analytic Line Review downplays the importance of this email, noting, " ... as a standard practice, we do not base analysis on e-mails and other informal communications from the field because such accounts often change when formalized as disseminated intelligence reports." 117

Moreover, it appears this reporting from those present during the attacks did not make its way into assessments at CIA Headquarters, as the Deputy Director of the Middle East and North Africa Analysis Office at CIA wrote an internal email, dated September 16, 2012, that rnentioned "protestors that preceded the violence."118 On September 18, 2012, the FBI and CIA reviewed the closed circuit television video from the Mission facility that showed there were no protests prior to the attacks. Although information gathered from interviews with U.S. personnel
who were on the ground during the attacks was shared informally between the FBI and CIA, it was not until two days later, on September 20, 2012, that the FBI disseminated its intelligence reports detailing such interviews.119

A dearth of clear and definitive HUMINT or eyewitness reporting led IC analysts to rely on open press reports and limited SIGINT reporting that incorrectly attributed the origins of the Benghazi attacks to "protests," over first-hand accounts from U.S. officials on the ground. CIA's January 4, 2013, Analytic Line Review found that "[a ]pproximately a dozen reports that included press accounts, public statements by AAS members, HUMINT reporting, DOD reporting, and signals
intelligence all stated or strongly suggested that a protest occurred outside of the Mission facility just prior to the attacks."120

Of the 11 reports cited by the CIA's Analytic Line Review, six were press articles, two were the public statements of Ansar al-Sharia, and the three others were intelligence reports. Specific open source reports and intelligence on which analysts appear to have based their judgments include the public statements by Ansar al-Sharia that the attacks were a "spontaneous and popular uprising."121 Also, there was protest activity in Egypt and approximately 40 other cities around the world and violent attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt from September 11-20, 2012. In addition, there were intelligence reports in the days following the Benghazi attacks that al-Qa'ida-associated terrorists hoped to take advantage of global protests for further attacks.122

As a result of evidence from closed circuit videos and other reports, the IC changed its assessment about a protest in classified intelligence reports on September 24, 2012, to state there were no demonstrations or protests at the Temporary Mission Facility prior to the attacks. This slow change in the official assessment affected the public statements of government officials, who continued to state in press interviews that there were protests outside the Mission compound. The IC continues to assess that although they do not think the first attack came out
of protests, the lethality and efficacy of the attack "did not require significant amounts of preplanning." 123 The IC continues to review the amount and nature of any preplanning that went into the attack.

LINK

So the SSCI talking points were given to members of Congress and Administration officials on Sept. 15 and they appear to draw from the open source info above re demonstrations/protests. These talking points appear not to have reflected info gathered from the Benghazi survivors starting on the same day, which would ultimately serve to dispel the bad info that a protest/demonstration had preceded the attack. The CCTV footage was not reviewed until Sept. 18, further supporting a lack of demonstrations/protests prior. The FBI then disseminated its new intel reports on Sept. 20.

Must be why Rice was sure to repeat:

quote:
RICE: Well, Jake, first of all, it's important to know that there's an FBI investigation that has begun and will take some time to be completed. That will tell us with certainty what transpired.

I think the CIA initial assessment was made in good faith based on the info they had at the time. A lot of this initial info came from local Libyan sources, including briefings from Libyan authorities. Turns out a lot of the info being provided by the Libyan authorities was not accurate or just flat wrong. But it took us longer to figure that out.

Certainly, the people who relied on those SSCI talking points relied on them in good faith, certainly those who used the talking points to discuss the matter on the Sunday talk shows on Sept. 16. I just don't see the scandal in this.